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RESTRAINING LIVE HAND CONTROL OF INHERITANCE
MARK GLOVER *
ABSTRACT
Inheritance law generally defers to the donor’s decisions
regarding what property should be distributed to which donees.
Because these decisions are carried out after the donor’s death,
the law’s deference to the donor has become known as “dead hand
control.” But just as the inheritance process is guided by the
decisions of the dead, it is also influenced by the choices of the
living. When the donor names a donee in their estate plan, the
donee must decide whether to accept or reject the gift. If the donee
accepts the gift, the property becomes theirs, but if the donee
rejects the gift, the property is distributed to an alternate donee.
Thus, inheritance law grants control not only to the dead hand of
the donor but also to the live hand of the donee. This latter
deference to the donee has become known as “live hand control.”
Although the law grants the donee broad freedom to accept or
reject inheritances, it restrains the donee’s ability to reject a gift
under some scenarios, and it restrains their ability to accept a gift
under others. Legal scholars have devoted considerable attention
to the study of each type of live hand restraint, but they typically
have focused on one type or the other without exploring possible
connections between the two. To fill this analytical void, this
Article will bring together the law’s restraints of acceptance and
rejection and seek to develop a unifying theoretical framework that
can guide policymakers in deciding when and how to restrain the
donee’s discretion to accept or reject a gift.
Specifically, this Article will argue that the law’s live hand
restraints, whether of rejection or acceptance, are primarily
founded upon the concern that the donee’s decisions to accept or
reject a gift will impose costs on others that the donee likely does
not take into account when making their decisions. In these
situations, deference to the donee might not be socially beneficial,
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and, consequently, the law restricts their decision-making ability.
Ultimately, informed by the insights gleaned from a comparative
analysis of the two types of live hand restraints, this Article will
explore specific reform proposals that can increase the social
welfare generated by the inheritance process.
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INTRODUCTION
Inheritance law relies upon autonomous individuals to decide how
property should be distributed upon death. Policymakers have neither crafted
a mandatory estate plan that governs the disposition of every estate nor given
probate courts the authority to question the merits of particular bequests. 1
Instead, the law generally defers to the donor’s decisions regarding what
property should be distributed to which donees. 2 By granting the donor this
broad freedom of disposition, the law attributes considerable weight to the
preferences of someone who is inevitably dead at the time those preferences
are honored. 3 The law’s deference to the donor’s decisions regarding the
1. See Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1136–37 (2013) (“[L]egislatures must rely on general
rules governing the succession of property (e.g., the first child inherits everything or each child
receives an equal share), which can be overinclusive, underinclusive, or both. Typically, courts
have neither the time nor the institutional capacity to investigate the circumstances of each decedent
to determine the optimal distribution.”).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“American law does not grant courts any general authority to
question the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his
or her property.”); see also infra Section I.A.
3. See John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful
Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 342 (2013) (“The interest of a prospective
beneficiary under a will or will substitute does not ripen into a cognizable legal right until the
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disposition of property after death has consequently become known as dead
hand control. 4
But just as the inheritance process is guided by the decisions of the dead,
it is also influenced by the choices of the living. When the donor names a
donee in their estate plan, that donee is not a passive participant in the
distribution of the donor’s property. To the contrary, the donee must
affirmatively decide whether to accept or reject the gift from the donor.5 If
the donee accepts the gift, the property becomes theirs, but if the donee rejects
the gift, the property is distributed to an alternate donee. 6 Thus, the law of
succession grants control not only to the dead hand of the donor but also to
the live hand of the donee. 7
The rationale underlying the law’s deference to individual
decisionmakers is that donors and donees are in the best position to evaluate
their own specific circumstances, and they can, therefore, make estateplanning decisions that generate the greatest utility from the transfer of the
donor’s estate. 8 The donor can choose the donees that they believe will
benefit the most, 9 and the donee can decide whether a particular gift would
truly be beneficial. 10 In this way, inheritance law seeks to maximize social
welfare. 11 However, despite this social welfare rationale of the law’s
deferential approach to inheritance, the law restrains both the donor’s and the
donee’s freedom to make estate-planning decisions in various

donor’s death. Until then, a prospective beneficiary has a mere ‘expectancy’ that is subject to
defeasance at the donor’s whim.”).
4. See Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82, Indep. Order of Odd Fellows v. Toscano, 64 Cal. Rptr.
816, 820 n.* (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (“[D]ead hand control [is] the right of the individual to control
property after death . . . .”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 643–44 (2014) (“The American law of succession embraces
freedom of disposition, authorizing dead hand control, to an extent that is unique among modern
legal systems.”).
5. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 588
(1989) (“The beneficiary of a gratuity may accept or reject it at his discretion.”); see also UNIF.
DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACTS, prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002) (explaining that the donee’s ability to accept or reject a testamentary gift
is “comprehensive” and that the law is generally “designed to allow every sort of disclaimer”).
6. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 140 (9th
ed. 2013).
7. The term “live hand control” has been used previously to describe the trustee’s authority
to make decisions regarding property held in trust. Keith L. Butler, Comment, Long Live the Dead
Hand: A Case for Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1237,
1257 (2000).
8. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135; see also infra Part I.
9. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68
IND. L.J. 1, 12–13 (1992); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136; see also infra Section I.A.
10. See Mark Glover, Freedom of Inheritance, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 283, 295–97 (2017); see
also infra Section I.B.
11. See Glover, supra note 10, at 295; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135.
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circumstances. 12 Put simply, there are some decisions that the law does not
rely upon donors and donees to make.
This Article will focus on the restraints the law places on the donee’s
freedom to decide whether to accept or reject a gift from the donor’s estate. 13
These live hand restraints can be classified into two general types: one type
restrains the donee’s ability to accept a gift, 14 and the other type restrains the
donee’s ability to reject a gift. 15 Although legal scholars have devoted
considerable attention to the study of each type of live hand restraint, they
typically have focused on one type or the other without exploring possible
connections between the two. 16
This inattention to the relationship between the two types of live hand
restraints has left inconsistencies in the law to go unnoticed and has perhaps
stalled reforms that are consistent with the law’s effort to maximize social
welfare. This Article therefore will analyze the law’s restraints of acceptance
and its restraints of rejection in tandem and explain how they address similar
social welfare concerns. Moreover, by bringing together the two general
types of live hand restraints, this Article will seek to develop a unifying
theoretical framework that can guide policymakers in deciding when and how
to restrain the donee’s discretion to accept or reject a gift. Ultimately,
informed by the insights gleaned from a comparative analysis of the two
types of live hand restraints, this Article will explore specific reform
proposals that can increase the social welfare generated by the inheritance
process.

12. For example, the law typically requires the donor to transfer a portion of their estate to their
surviving spouse, thereby preventing the donor from transferring the property to other donees. See
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 512–16; see, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). Similarly, the law denies the donee the
ability to avoid federal tax liens by rejecting a gift from the donor. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra
note 6, at 142–43; see, e.g., Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999); see also infra notes 94–100
and accompanying text.
13. For scholarship focusing on the restrictions that the law places on the donor’s freedom of
disposition, see Mark Glover, A Social Welfare Theory of Inheritance Regulation, 2018 UTAH L.
REV. 411 (2018); Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2180 (2011); Kelly, supra note 1.
14. See infra Section II.A.1.
15. See infra Section II.A.2.
16. For scholarship focusing on restraints of the donee’s ability to accept, see, for example,
Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving Heirs?—The Case of the “Terminated” Parent, 40 U. RICH. L.
REV. 547 (2006); Karen J. Sneddon, Should Cain’s Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading Into
the Extended Slayer Rule Quagmire, 76 UMKC L. REV. 101 (2007); Carla Spivack, Killers
Shouldn’t Inherit from Their Victims—Or Should They?, 48 GA. L. REV. 145, 194 (2013). For
scholarship focusing on restraints of the donee’s ability to reject a gift, see, for example, Adam J.
Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2014); Reid Kress Weisbord,
The Governmental Stake in Private Wealth Transfer, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1229, 1245 (2018). In some
instances, connections between the two types of live hand restraints have been made. See, e.g.,
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 127–40 (discussing both the slayer rule and disclaimers
under a common heading of “BARS TO SUCCESSION”).
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This Article will proceed in four Parts. Part I will describe the law’s
general deference to both the dead hand of the donor and the live hand of the
donee. In particular, it will explain how the law attempts to maximize social
welfare through deference to individual decisionmakers. Part II will identify
the restraints that the law places on the donee’s ability to accept or reject
testamentary gifts and analyze how such restraints of the live hand can further
the law’s goal of maximizing social welfare. Part III then will compare and
contrast the two general types of live hand restraints and argue that
inconsistencies between the two types undermine the law’s social welfare
goals. Finally, Part IV will identify opportunities for policymakers to reform
live hand restraints that both harmonize these inconsistencies and maximize
social welfare.
I. INHERITANCE AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL WELFARE
The autonomous decisionmakers regarding inheritance include both the
donor and the donee. 17 To be sure, the donor must make the initial decisions
concerning how they would like their property distributed upon death. 18 But
the donee is not a passive actor within the process of inheritance; indeed, after
the donor’s death, the donee must decide whether to accept or reject a gift
from the donor. 19 The law generally does not require the donee to accept a
transfer from the donor’s estate. Instead, the law grants the donee the
discretion to decide for themselves whether to accept the gift. 20 Whereas the
donor’s autonomy to freely decide how to dispose of property is referred to
as “freedom of disposition,” 21 the donee’s autonomy to decide whether to
accept or reject an inheritance is referred to as “freedom of inheritance.” 22
A. Dead Hand Control
The Restatement (Third) of Property (the “Restatement”) places
freedom of disposition at the center of the modern law of succession when it
states, “The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers
is freedom of disposition. Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right

17. See generally Glover, supra note 10.
18. See Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1245 (explaining that donors have “a broad power to
determine who gets what”); see also infra Section I.A.
19. See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 588; see also infra Section I.B.
20. See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT § 5 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002) (explaining “the principle behind all disclaimers,” and
therefore the donee’s discretion to accept or reject a gift from the donor, is that “no one can be
forced to accept property”); see also infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003); Sitkoff, supra note 4, at 643.
22. See generally Glover, supra note 10. For other uses of the term “freedom of inheritance”
see id. at 284 n.5.
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to dispose of their property as they please.” 23 Thus, the law grants the donor
the ability to make estate-planning decisions, and it generally does not second
guess those decisions. 24 The underlying rationale of the law’s deferential
approach to inheritance is that such a system maximizes social welfare. 25 As
Professor Daniel Kelly explains, “[m]ost scholars today” view testamentary
freedom from a “functional perspective [that] emphasizes the ‘social welfare’
of the parties and seeks to determine how the law can create the best
incentives for the donor, donees, and other parties that a donor’s disposition
of property may affect.” 26 Professor Kelly’s explanation suggests freedom
of disposition can increase social welfare in a number of ways, including by
increasing the individual welfare of both the donor and potential donees and
by implementing incentives that encourage socially beneficial behavior.
First, freedom of disposition maximizes the individual welfare of the
donor. 27 Autonomy over the distribution of property at death can be a source

23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a; see also In re Estate of Malloy, 949 P.2d 804, 806 (Wash. 1998) (“A basic principle
underlying any discussion of the law of wills is that an individual has the right and the freedom to
dispose of his or her property, upon death, according to the dictates of his or her own desires.”);
THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 349 (5th ed. 2011) (“Freedom of disposition is a hallmark of the American law
of succession.”); Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 569,
569 (2016) (“[A] will’s validity and the ultimate disposition of the decedent’s estate . . . turn upon
the decedent’s testamentary intent.”); Hirsch, supra note 5, at 632 (“[C]ourts traditionally exalt
freedom of testation and the fulfillment of testamentary intent as central to gratuitous transfers
policy.”); Paula A. Monopoli, Toward Equality: Nonmarital Children and the Uniform Probate
Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 995, 1010 n.94 (2012) (“Freedom of testation and testator’s intent
are frequently identified as paramount jurisprudential touchstones in the area of trusts and estates.”);
E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 278 (1999)
(“The ideal of testamentary freedom grounds the law of testation.”).
24. See Cantrell v. Cantrell, No. M2002-02883-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 3044907, at *5 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (“A fundamental principle of the law of wills is that a testator is entitled to
dispose of the testator’s property as [they] see[] fit, regardless of any perceived injustice that may
result from such a choice.”); Sitkoff, supra note 4, at 644 (“The right of a property owner to dispose
of his or her property on terms that he or she chooses has come to be recognized as a separate stick
in the bundle of rights called property.”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping
Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 882 (2012) (“The most fundamental guiding
principle of American inheritance law is testamentary freedom—that the person who owns property
during life has the power to direct its disposition at death.”).
25. See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical
Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 432 (2001) (“The most prevalent justification for testamentary
freedom is the utilitarian view which posits that testamentary freedom is not a right but rather a
privilege offered for the purpose of motivating socially desirable behavior.”); Eva E. Subotnik,
Copyright and the Living Dead?: Succession Law and the Postmortem Term, 29 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 77, 96 (2015) (“Support for a system of testamentary freedom—whether one focuses on the
right of testation or of inheritance—is often based on utilitarian goals of promoting happiness.”).
26. Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135.
27. See id. at 1135–36.
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of happiness to the donor during their life, 28 especially when the donor knows
that they can take care of close family and friends through the distribution of
their estate. 29 If the law substantially curtailed dead hand control, then the
donor would lose this source of comfort and satisfaction; their individual
welfare would decrease; and consequently social welfare as a whole would
decline. 30 Thus, by maximizing the donor’s individual welfare through its
deferential approach to inheritance, the law seeks to maximize overall social
welfare.
Second, the donor’s freedom of disposition maximizes the individual
welfare of donees. 31 The law’s deferential approach to inheritance allows the
donor to examine the needs and circumstances of potential donees and to
place property in the hands of those who will benefit the most. 32 If the law
did not defer to dead hand control, state legislators and probate judges would
have to make decisions regarding the distribution of the donor’s estate. These
legislators and judges are not as well positioned as the donor to compare the
needs of all potential donees and to gauge the relative merits of the vast array
of possible dispositions of property. 33 Consequently, their estate planning

28. See Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 445 (2012) (“The most basic therapeutic consequence of the autonomous
decision-making permitted by testamentary freedom is the testators’ satisfaction of knowing that
they have wide latitude to prepare an estate plan that best fulfills their preferences.”); Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 9, at 8 (explaining that “modern social scientists” assume “that persons derive
satisfaction out of bequeathing property to others”); Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187 (“Gratuitous
transfers . . . gratify a benefactor, whose happiness depends on [the recipients’ happiness].”);
Subotnik, supra note 25, at 96 (“In its simplest incarnation, the intuition is that the ability to leave
property to the persons of one’s choosing provides a sense of comfort and happiness.”).
29. See Glover, supra note 28, at 445 (“Of the various preferences that testators can satisfy
through freedom of testation, perhaps the most urgent and universal is the care of their families after
the testators’ own deaths.”); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1–4, in DEATH,
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (“[A] society should be
concerned with the total amount of happiness it can offer, and to many of its members it is a great
comfort and satisfaction to know during life that, even after death, those whom one cares about can
be provided for and may be able to enjoy better lives because of the inheritance that can be left to
them.”).
30. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65 (2004)
(explaining that “[i]n an important sense, bequeathing property is simply one way of using property.
And therefore society should not interfere with bequests” because “this tends to reduce individuals’
utility directly (a person will derive less utility from property if he wants to bequeath it but is
prevented from doing so)”); see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 8 (“To the extent that lawmakers
deny persons the opportunity to bequeath freely, the subjective value of property will drop, for one
of its potential uses will have disappeared.”); Gordon Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 U. CHI. J.L.
& ECON. 465, 474 (1971) (“Individuals before their death would be injured if they are prohibited
from passing on their estate to their heirs because it eliminates one possible alternative which they
might otherwise choose.”).
31. See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187 (“Gratuitous transfers obviously benefit
recipients . . . .”).
32. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 12; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136–37.
33. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136–37.
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decisions likely would not put the donor’s property to its best use.34 The
law’s grant of freedom of disposition, by contrast, maximizes social welfare
by allowing the donor to engage in “intelligent estate planning,” 35 which
more likely places property in the hands of donees who will benefit the
most. 36
Finally, freedom of disposition maximizes social welfare by
incentivizing socially beneficial behavior both by the donor and by potential
donees. With respect to the donor, the law’s deference to the dead hand
encourages them to generate wealth during life. 37 By contrast, if the law did
not defer to the donor’s estate planning decisions, then the donor might not
find it as worthwhile to engage in productive activities, 38 and overall societal
wealth might decline. 39 With respect to potential donees, freedom of
disposition encourages them to care for the donor during times of ill health
or old age. 40 If donees know that the donor has the ability either to punish
them through disinheritance or reward them with a handsome bequest, then
they will more likely cater to the donor’s needs. 41 This incentive increases

34. See id.
35. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 12.
36. See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 44 (1995) (“Certainly, benefactors can be expected to possess
the information and insight into their families’ affairs necessary to distribute their wealth in a
rational manner.”); Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict
Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163, 177 (1996) (“Testamentary
freedom . . . allows the testator to weigh the varying needs of his family.”); Joshua C. Tate,
Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
445, 484 (2006) (“[T]he testator . . . can distribute property in accordance [with] each family
member’s needs.”).
37. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 8 (“[F]reedom of testation creates an incentive to
industry and saving.”); Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187 (“Giving persons the right to make a will . . .
encourages them to produce and to save more wealth, . . . adding to the sum of capital stock.”
(footnote omitted)); Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control,
64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 749 (1990) (“Allowing owners to give their assets and money to others,
whether at death or inter vivos, creates an incentive for productive activities.”); Subotnik, supra
note 25, at 96–97 (“[Some] commentators have focused . . . on the . . . notion that testamentary
freedom generates a more productive citizenry, since individuals have motivations not just to save,
but also to produce wealth in the first place.”).
38. See SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 65 (explaining that restricting freedom of disposition
“lowers [individuals’] incentives to work (a person will not work as hard to accumulate property if
he cannot then bequeath it as he pleases)”).
39. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 8 (“[T]hwarted testators will choose to accumulate
less property, and the total stock of wealth existing at any given time will shrink.”); see also
Subotnik, supra note 25, at 96 (“Such incentives promote wealth maximization—a gauge of utility
maximization for some—since individuals have reasons to accumulate wealth over and above that
which is needed during their own lifetimes.” (footnote omitted)).
40. See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187–88; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1137.
41. See Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 129, 179 (2008) (explaining that “[t]he U.S. rule” of broad freedom of disposition “allows
a parent to punish a child for failing to provide care, but it also allows a parent to reward a child . . .
who does provide care”); see also Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2235 (suggesting that “the behaviors
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social welfare because, as Professors Adam Hirsch and William Wang
explain, it “supports . . . a market for the provision of social services” and
“encourages . . . beneficiaries to provide [the donor] with care and comfort—
services that add to the total economic ‘pie.’” 42 Therefore, by granting the
donor broad freedom of disposition, the law seeks not only to increase the
individual welfare of donors and donees but also to incentivize donors and
donees in socially beneficial ways, all of which maximizes overall social
welfare.
B. Live Hand Control
Just as the law grants the donor broad freedom of disposition, it also
grants the donee broad freedom of inheritance. 43 Thus, when the donor
names a donee as a beneficiary of their estate, the donee has the option either
to accept the gift or reject it.44 As Professor Hirsch explains, “Most
beneficiaries accept inheritances with open arms; other ones prefer, for
whatever reason, to reject them. Under most circumstances today,
beneficiaries are free to accept or reject an inheritance as they see fit.”45 In
the terminology of inheritance law, the donee exercises their discretion to
reject a gift by “disclaiming” their interest in the donor’s property. 46 When
the donee disclaims an inheritance, the donee is treated as having predeceased
the donor, and the disclaimed property is distributed to alternate donees. 47
The law therefore generally defers not only to the dead hand of the donor
regarding how property should be distributed but also to the live hand of the
donee regarding whether property is accepted or rejected.

parents might seek to elicit” through the exercise of freedom of disposition “take many forms, but
one of them now looms in importance,” namely “end-of-life care giving”).
42. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 9–10; see Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2234 (explaining that
“[g]ranting parents leeway to vary or deny bequests to children produces economic benefits of the
sort that freedom of testation ideally achieves”).
43. See Glover, supra note 10, at 292; see also supra Section I.A.
44. See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 588.
45. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1872 (footnote omitted).
46. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 140. “By traditional usage, an heir
renounces; a beneficiary under a will disclaims. Today, the two words are used interchangeably as
synonyms. The term disclaimer is the one more commonly used to describe the formal refusal to
take by an heir or a beneficiary.” Id. at 140 n.81.
47. See Adam J. Hirsch, Revisions in Need of Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of Property
Interests Act, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 163 (2001) (“In the absence of testamentary instructions,
disclaimed property goes to whomever would have received it had the disclaimant predeceased the
benefactor, as determined by the state’s antilapse and intestacy statutes; but if a will does anticipate
this contingency by naming a substitute beneficiary in the event that the primary beneficiary
disclaims, that stipulation controls the devolution of the property.” (footnote omitted)). “Under
UDPIA, a contingency clause specifying how a bequest will devolve in the event the beneficiary
predeceases is broadly construed to govern the devolution of a bequest a surviving beneficiary
disclaims.” Id. at 163 n.263.
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As explained above, the law’s deference to the dead hand has social
welfare benefits, 48 and, in various ways, so too does the law’s deference to
the live hand. First, freedom of inheritance maximizes the donee’s individual
welfare. 49 Although the donor is in a better position than state legislators or
probate judges to assess the utility of the donor’s estate plan, 50 the donee is
perhaps in the best position to evaluate the benefit that they would receive
from a specific transfer from the donor’s estate. By granting the donee
freedom of inheritance, the law allows the donee to evaluate a gift from the
donor and to accept it only if it will increase their individual welfare.51 As
the Supreme Court of Georgia explained, “Property is a burden as well as a
benefit, and whoever is unwilling to bear the burden for the sake of the
benefit, is at liberty to decline both.” 52 Thus, if a gift from the donor will
increase the donee’s individual welfare, the donee will accept it, but if the
burdens of the gift outweigh its benefits, the donee will disclaim the gift. In
this way, the law’s grant of freedom of inheritance and its consequent respect
for the donee’s autonomy maximizes social welfare.
Second, the donee’s freedom of inheritance maximizes most donor’s
individual welfare. 53 As explained previously, the donor’s ability to select
what property should go to which beneficiaries can be a source of comfort
and satisfaction for the donor. 54 And although the donee’s ability to reject a
gift would seem to undermine the donor’s intent, freedom of inheritance
actually increases the social welfare benefits of freedom of disposition
because most donors likely want the donee to have the option to accept or
reject a gift. By naming a donee as a beneficiary of the donor’s estate, the
donor likely intends to confer a benefit to the donee, and therefore the welfare
of the donor is linked to the welfare of the donee. 55 Put simply, the donor’s

48. See supra Section I.A.
49. See Glover, supra note 10, at 295–97.
50. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
51. See Hirsch, supra note 47, at 117 (“Only later, after the feudal incidents were abolished,
did British courts come to allow disclaimers by devisees, for the very different purpose of permitting
beneficiaries to escape bequests that might be ‘clothed in trust,’ or otherwise entail burdensome
responsibilities.”); Andrew S. Bender, Note, Disclaimer Law: A Call for Statutory Reform, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 887, 898 (2001) (“[T]he belief prevails that the disclaimant should not be forced to
accept a gift if doing so would impose too great a burden on her. Essentially, there is a general
agreement and recognition that any individual using a disclaimer in this manner possesses a valid
motive.” (footnote ommitted)).
52. Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 706 (1879).
53. See Glover, supra note 10, at 297–99.
54. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
55. See SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 58 (“A major motivation for giving a gift is pure altruism:
The donor cares about the well-being of the donee; that is, the donor obtains utility from the utility
of the donee.”); Louis Kaplow, On the Taxation of Private Transfers, 63 TAX L. REV. 159, 176
(2009) (“One possibility is that donors are to an extent altruistic, which is to say that raising the
utility of their donees increases their own utility. Altruism seems to be evidenced, for example, by
parents’ hard work aimed to improve their children’s prospects in life.”).
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welfare increases from their knowledge that the donee’s welfare will increase
as a result of the gift. 56 Under this line of reasoning, the donor would not
want the donee to accept property that is more burdensome than beneficial.
Freedom of inheritance consequently increases the donor’s welfare by
providing them the peace of mind that the donee’s welfare will not decrease
as a result of a gift. 57
Finally, freedom of inheritance maximizes social welfare by allowing
the donee to engage in postmortem estate planning. 58 Although the donor is
in the best position to evaluate the utility of their estate plan and consequently
the law generally relies upon the donor to make decisions regarding the
distribution of their property, 59 there is no guarantee that the donor will
exercise their freedom of disposition in a way that maximizes social
welfare. 60 Indeed, for various reasons, the donor might die with an estate
plan that is suboptimal from a social welfare perspective. 61 For instance, the
donor might make poor decisions because they have imperfect information
at the time they craft their estate plan.62 The donor makes estate-planning

56. See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187 (“Although benefactors cannot share in a beneficiary’s
utility from an inheritance at the time of its receipt, they can envision it, and derive present utility
from its anticipation.”); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1148–49 (“A gift . . . may increase the donor’s
happiness due to altruism. If a donor is altruistic, the donor’s utility is a function of the donees’
utility, i.e., the preferences of the donor incorporate the well-being of the donees.” (footnote
omitted)).
57. Of course, a donor’s motivations for giving are not limited to pure altruism (for example,
self-interest or feelings of obligation); however, even if the donor is motivated by other concerns,
the donee’s freedom of inheritance likely does not undermine freedom of disposition’s social
welfare benefits. See Glover, supra note 10, at 297–99.
58. See id. at 299–311.
59. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
60. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 13 (“[T]he assumption that [donors] will in general
use freedom of [disposition] to craft thoughtful schemes of distribution is not unproblematic. . . .
[The donor] may know best; but, alas, we have no assurance that in practice he will do what is best.”
(emphases omitted)); see also Kelly, supra note 1, at 1138 (“Effectuating a donor’s ex ante interests
is not necessarily equivalent to maximizing social welfare.”).
61. In addition to the problem of imperfect information that is discussed in this Section, moral
hazard concerns and transaction costs might cause the donor to leave behind a suboptimal estate
plan, and the donor’s freedom of inheritance can address these concerns. See Glover, supra note
10, at 297–310.
62. See Richard C. Ausness, Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand: The
Modification and Termination of “Irrevocable” Trusts, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 237, 295 (2015)
(“According to one school of thought, imperfect information, particularly about future events and
circumstances, may cause donors to make dispositions of their property that they would not have
made had they been better prognosticators. Unfortunately, once the donor is dead, such decisions
cannot be reversed.”) (footnote omitted)); Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2239 (“When providing for
existing family members, a testator brings to the estate-planning process a depth of knowledge
gleaned from a lifetime of interaction with them. But the same temporal horizon that obstructs tacit
bargains between a testator and future generations clouds his or her ability to see—and hence to see
to—their needs.” (emphasis omitted)); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1158 (“Future events are difficult to
foresee and unanticipated contingencies may arise. As a result, a donor may dispose of property in
a way that contradicts what the donor would have wanted with complete information.”).
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decisions during their lifetime, but those decisions have no effect until some
point in the future when they die. Because the donor plans for the future
based only upon their presently known information, circumstances might
change in ways that render their estate plan ineffective in maximizing social
welfare. 63
The donee’s freedom of inheritance, however, partially addresses this
problem of imperfect information. Because the donee makes their decision
whether to accept or reject a gift after the donor dies, the donee has better
information regarding the circumstances that exist when the donor’s estate
plan becomes effective. 64 As such, the donee can reassess the donor’s
decision to leave property to them with a better understanding of the utility
that the transfer will produce. If the donee determines that the property is put
to its best use in their own hands, they can accept the gift. But if the donee
determines that the alternate taker would benefit more, they can increase the
welfare generated by the donor’s estate by disclaiming the gift. In sum, with
the benefit of better information, the donee can maximize the utility of the
donor’s estate plan. Therefore, freedom of inheritance maximizes social
welfare by not only increasing the individual welfare of both the donor and
the donee but also by allowing the donee to engage in postmortem estate
planning.
II. RESTRAINING THE LIVE HAND
While the law typically defers to the donee’s discretion regarding
whether to accept or reject a gift from the donor, 65 freedom of inheritance has
limits. Although the donee’s discretion to accept or reject a transfer from the
donor’s estate has been described as an “absolute right,” 66 Professor Hirsch
explains that “[n]either history nor current theory supports the notion that
citizens must enjoy complete transactional liberty.”67 Professor Hirsch
points out that the law restricts an individual’s transactional liberty in a
variety of contexts, 68 which include limiting both freedom of contract and
freedom of disposition. The law’s treatment of freedom of inheritance is no
different. It grants the donee discretion to accept or reject testamentary
63. See David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675,
1703 (2009) (“Even the savviest investor cannot predict how to allocate assets efficiently in the
distant future.”); see also Reid Kress Weisbord, Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and
Unanticipated Circumstances, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2014) (“Had the donor known of
circumstances causing the original beneficiary to disclaim, the donor presumably would have
skipped the original beneficiary altogether in favor of the next eligible beneficiary.”).
64. See Glover, supra note 10, at 302–06.
65. See supra Section I.B.
66. Dean David Gamin, Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Benefit as Fraudulent Transfer,
37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 148, 159 (1986).
67. Hirsch, supra note 5, at 627 (footnote omitted).
68. Id.
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transfers; but, in certain situations, it restricts the donee’s discretion. In other
words, just as the law restrains the dead hand of the donor, it also restrains
the live hand of the donee.
A. Restraints
The restraints that the law places on the donee’s freedom of inheritance
can be separated into two categories: (1) restraints of acceptance and (2)
restraints of rejection. Restraints of acceptance deny the donee the ability to
accept property from the donor’s estate under certain circumstances. 69
Conversely, restraints of rejection limit the donee’s freedom of inheritance
by eliminating beneficial consequences of a donee’s decision to disclaim
property under some scenarios. 70 Whereas restraints of acceptance force the
donee to reject a transfer from the donor, restraints of rejection increase the
likelihood that the donee will accept a transfer from the donor.
1. Restraints of Acceptance
Restraints of acceptance limit the donee’s ability to accept a transfer by
requiring them to disclaim it. Although in recent years other such restraints
have emerged, 71 the slayer rule is the traditional example of a restraint that
the law places on the donee’s ability to accept a transfer from the donor. The
details of the rule vary from state to state, 72 but, in general, the slayer rule
prevents a donee who intentionally kills the donor from benefiting from their
victim. 73 The killer cannot take from their victim regardless of whether the
donor names the killer as a donee in a will or a non-probate will substitute or
whether the transfer is the result of the donor dying intestate.74 Moreover,
69. See infra Section II.A.1.
70. See infra Section II.A.2.
71. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 139–40; see also infra notes 87–89 and
accompanying text.
72. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137–39.
73. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2010) (“An individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent forfeits all
benefits . . . with respect to the decedent’s estate . . . .”). One area of variation amongst the states
relates to how the court determines that the donee killed the donor. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,
supra note 6, at 138. Additionally, in some states, the slayer rule does not merely prevent the
murderous donee from accepting a gift from their victim. Instead, under certain circumstances, the
rule also prohibits the slayer’s descendants from accepting a gift from the victim. See DUKEMINIER
& SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 138 (explaining “[s]ome states extend the bar by statute to the killer’s
descendants,” and “[o]ther states limit the right of the killer’s descendants to take by case law”); see
generally Sneddon, supra note 16.
74. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(b) (explaining the killer “forfeits all benefits . . . with
respect to the decedent’s estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse’s
or child’s share, a homestead allowance, exempt property, and a family allowance”). Although it is
well established that the slayer rule bars the killer from taking from the donor’s probate estate, there
may still be some uncertainty as to whether the slayer rule applies to nonprobate will substitutes.
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137.
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with one or two exceptions, 75 all states bar the killer from inheriting even
when the donor expressly provides that a donee should benefit regardless of
whether the donee kills them. 76
The slayer rule need not be characterized as a restraint of the donee’s
freedom of inheritance. Instead, the rule could be framed as a majoritarian
default rule that is designed to fulfill the donor’s probable intent. 77 Under
this characterization, because most donors would not want their killers to
benefit from their estates, 78 the law revokes their gifts, thereby achieving a
result that most likely comports with the donor’s intent. Alternatively, the
slayer rule could be framed as a restraint of the donor’s freedom of
disposition. 79 Under this characterization, the donor should not be able to
give property to their killer because the exercise of freedom of disposition in
this way would undermine the law’s social welfare goals. 80
Despite the slayer rule’s characterization as either a majoritarian default
rule that implements the donor’s probable intent or a restraint of the donor’s
freedom of disposition that limits dead hand control, the Restatement makes
clear that the object of the rule’s focus is the donee and not the donor. It
explains, “The [slayer rule] is sometimes described as [a rule] that ‘revokes’
any provision in the testator’s will in favor of the killer.”81 However, the
rule’s “governing principle is the supervening public policy that prevents a
wrongdoer from profiting from the wrong, and not revocation by the
testator.” 82
Under this characterization, which emphasizes the conduct of the donee,
the slayer rule can be framed as a limitation on freedom of inheritance that
denies the killer the discretion to accept a transfer from the donor’s estate by
requiring them to reject it. Simply put, the slayer rule forces the killer to
75. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137 (identifying Wisconsin and Louisiana
as two possible exceptions).
76. See id. (“Suppose H, aware of W’s psychological instability, provides in his will for the
creation of a trust for the benefit of W even if W kills him. W then kills H. Does W take? . . . In [the
vast majority of] states, the answer appears to be No.”).
77. See Thomas E. Simmons, A Chinese Inheritance, 30 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 124, 131
(2017) (“Still another potential rationale for the slayer rule is simply presumed majoritarian
intent . . . .”). Professor Hirsch suggests that this rationale is not the primary justification of the
slayer rule. See Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH.
U. L. REV. 609, 621 (2009) (“The rule’s alternative justification as a means of effectuating testators’
probable wishes has not gone unnoticed, but it is plainly subordinate.” (footnote omitted)).
78. See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2214 (“This rule adjusts the estate plan to the probable intent
of the victim in most instances, for testators rarely wish to provide for their assassins . . . .”).
79. See id. (describing the slayer rule as a “restriction on freedom of testation”).
80. But see Glover, supra note 13, at 445–54 (arguing that, when characterized as a restraint
of the donor’s freedom of disposition, the traditional slayer rule does not maximize social welfare
and proposing reforms).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. r
(AM. LAW. INST. 1999).
82. Id.
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disclaim their interest in the donor’s property. The connection between a
voluntary disclaimer and an involuntary disclaimer through the application
of the slayer rule is evident in how the law disposes the donor’s property in
both contexts. When the donee voluntarily disclaims a transfer, the law
directs the donee’s gift to the alternate donee who would have benefited from
the transfer had the primary donee died before the donor. 83 Likewise, when
the slayer rule requires the donee to disclaim a transfer, the law distributes
the donor’s property as though the killer predeceased the donor. 84 In fact, the
Uniform Probate Code makes this connection explicit by simply treating the
killer as if they disclaimed their interest in the donor’s estate. 85 The slayer
rule can therefore be seen as restraining the donee’s freedom of inheritance
by denying the killer the discretion to accept a transfer from the donor’s
estate.
In addition to the traditional slayer rule, other restraints of acceptance
have recently emerged in a few states that prevent the donee from taking from
the donor’s estate based upon some type of misconduct.86 For example, some
states bar a donee who physically abuses the donor from accepting a gift from
their victim. 87 Similarly, others bar a donee who engages in certain types of
financial misconduct from taking from their victim’s estate.88 The donees
who are barred from taking a gift from the donor, whether by the traditional

83. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 140; Hirsch, supra note 47, at 163.
84. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 138 (“The prevailing view is that the killer
is treated as having predeceased the victim.”).
85. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
2010) (explaining that “[i]f the decedent died intestate, the decedent’s intestate estate passes as if
the killer disclaimed his [or her] intestate share”); id. § 2-803(e) (explaining that “[p]rovisions of a
governing instrument . . . are given effect as if the killer disclaimed”).
86. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 139 (“In the United States, unworthy heirs—
whose conduct bars inheritance—are usually limited to killers. In nearly all other situations,
intestate succession is fixed by status: bloodline kinship, marriage, or adoption. But some
exceptions for unworthy heirs are developing.”); Anne-Marie Rhodes, Blood and Behavior, 36 AM.
C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 143, 170–75 (2010) (“[L]egislatures responding to public outcry over
egregious cases have enacted new statutes disinheriting heirs because of their misconduct. These
disinheritance statutes generally fall into three categories: slayers, child abandonment, and elder
abuse.”).
87. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 139 (“A handful of states—including California,
Pennsylvania, and Illinois—have statutes that deny inheritance from children or elderly relatives
who were abused by the heir.”); see, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 112.465 (2015). Statutes barring inheritance due to abuse often restrict the situations in which
inheritance barred based upon the vulnerability of the donor. See Anne-Marie Rhodes,
Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 975,
986 (2007) (“These specific statutes on abuse distinguish based on the victim, that is, abuse of a
child and abuse of an adult or elderly decedent . . . .” (footnote omitted)). For a proposal that spousal
abuse should bar inheritance, see Carla Spivack, Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar
Inheritance, 90 OR. L. REV. 247 (2011).
88. See Rhodes, supra note 87, at 986 (“The triggering conduct of abuse varies among . . .
jurisdictions, some including financial exploitation as well as physical abuse.”); see, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-456 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.84.020 (West 2006).
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slayer rule or the newer statutes that focus on conduct other than killing, have
become known as “unworthy heirs.” 89 Although the rules barring inheritance
by these unworthy heirs can be characterized as either majoritarian default
rules or rules that restrict the donor’s freedom of disposition, 90 they can also
be framed as restrictions of live hand control. 91 In particular, these rules
represent restraints of acceptance that limit the donee’s freedom of
inheritance by requiring them to reject their interest in the donor’s estate.
2. Restraints of Rejection
In contrast to restraints of acceptance, which limit the donee’s ability to
accept a transfer from the donor, restraints of rejection limit the consequences
of the donee’s decision to disclaim a transfer. 92 Two particular contexts
illustrate how restraints of rejection operate: (1) a restraint involving an
insolvent donee; and (2) a restraint involving Medicaid eligibility.
First, an insolvent donee generally can disclaim a transfer from the
donor’s estate and prevent their creditors from taking the donor’s property to
satisfy their debts. 93 However, the United States Supreme Court has held that
a donee cannot disclaim a transfer from the donor’s estate in order to avoid
federal tax liens. 94 In Drye v. United States, 95 a donor died leaving $233,000
to her son. 96 Prior to his mother’s death, the son had amassed $325,000 in
back taxes, and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) had filed tax liens
against the son’s property. 97 Wanting to avoid the seizure of his mother’s
property and knowing that his daughter would take the gift if he did not, the
son disclaimed the transfer from his mother’s estate. 98 Recognizing that
under state law the donee’s disclaimer could remove the donor’s property

89. In re Estate of Haviland, 301 P.3d 31, 41 (Wash. 2013) (Chambers, J., dissenting) (“It is
plain to me that the true evil the legislature wished to end was elder abuse, not inheritance by
unworthy heirs.”); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 139 (“In the United States, unworthy
heirs—whose conduct bars inheritance—are usually limited to killers.”); Frances H. Foster,
Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 77, 80 (1998) (“U.S. legislatures, courts, and scholars have . . . expand[ed] the category of socalled ‘unworthy heirs’—those heirs whose conduct toward the decedent is deemed so
‘reprehensible’ that they are disqualified from inheritance.”).
90. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
92. See Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1255 (explaining that “[c]onstraining the power to
disclaim . . . alters the consequences of a donee’s choice to renounce”).
93. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 142.
94. See id. at 142–43; Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1885–87.
95. 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
96. Id. at 52–53 (explaining that “$158,000 was personalty and $75,000 was realty located in
Pulaski County, Arkansas”).
97. Id. at 53.
98. Id.
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from the reach of ordinary creditors, 99 the Supreme Court nevertheless held
that “the disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax liens.” 100
Although the Court did not prevent the donee from disclaiming his
interest in the donor’s estate, it did eliminate the benefit that the donee sought
to enjoy by disclaiming, namely the removal of property from the reach of
the IRS. Indeed, after Drye, the IRS can reach property that is in the hands
of the donee, and it can reach gifted property that is in the hands of others
because the donee has disclaimed it. Thus, the holding in Drye does not
represent an absolute restraint of rejection because the donee maintains the
ability to disclaim, yet it can still be seen as a restraint of rejection because it
limits the consequences of the donee’s decision to disclaim.
The second context in which the law places a restraint of rejection on
the donee’s freedom of inheritance involves Medicaid eligibility. Medicaid
is a governmental assistance program that provides healthcare benefits to
individuals with limited financial resources. 101 To qualify for these benefits,
an individual must meet certain income and resource qualifications.102 When
a Medicaid recipient is entitled to a transfer from a donor’s estate, courts have
grappled with the issue of how the donee’s disclaimer of the transfer should
affect their Medicaid eligibility. 103
For instance, Troy v. Hart 104 involved a Medicaid recipient who was
entitled to $100,000 from his sister’s estate. 105 If the donee accepted the
transfer, he would have been ineligible for Medicaid, and he would have been
required to use his inheritance to pay for his medical care. 106 However, he
disclaimed the transfer; the $100,000 was split amongst his surviving sisters;
and his financial resources remained at a level that qualified him for Medicaid
assistance. 107
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found the donee’s exercise of
freedom of inheritance within this context troubling. The court admonished
99. Id. (“The disavowing heir’s creditors, Arkansas law provides, may not reach property thus
disclaimed.”).
100. Id. at 52.
101. See John A. Miller, Medicaid Spend Down, Estate Recovery and Divorce: Doctrine,
Planning and Policy, 23 ELDER L.J. 41, 46–47 (2015).
102. See id. at 47–56.
103. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1897 (“With few exceptions, state courts testing the issue . . .
have judged disclaimers ineffective to render beneficiaries eligible for Medicaid. Wherever courts
have allowed them, state legislators have reacted promptly to overturn the decisions. No federal
court has yet spoken to the matter.” (footnotes omitted)).
104. 116 Md. App. 468, 697 A.2d 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
105. Id. at 472, 697 A.2d at 115.
106. See id. at 480, 697 A.2d at 118.
107. See id. at 472–73, 697 A.2d at 115. Professor Hirsch describes the general scenario of a
disclaimer affecting Medicaid eligibility: “Medicaid provides medical benefits to citizens in
financial distress. An inheritance relieves that distress and can cause a citizen to become ineligible
for Medicaid. In turn, a beneficiary might disclaim an inheritance in an effort to maintain his or her
eligibility.” Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1896.
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the use of a disclaimer to maintain Medicaid eligibility by stating: “What is
ludicrous, if not repugnant, to public policy is that one who is able to regain
the ability to be financially self-sufficient, albeit for a temporary or even brief
period of time, may voluntarily relinquish his windfall.” 108 To avoid this
result, the court held, “If a recipient renounces an inheritance that would
cause him to be financially disqualified from receiving benefits, the
renunciation should incur the same penalty of disqualification that
acceptance would have brought about, and should render the recipient liable
for any payments incorrectly paid by the State in consequence.” 109
While the court did not directly restrain the donee’s freedom of
inheritance by rendering his disclaimer ineffective, it indirectly imposed a
restraint of rejection by extinguishing the benefit that he received from
disclaiming. 110 Put simply, the court held that the donee maintains the ability
to disclaim but the donee’s Medicaid eligibility should be calculated as if
they had accepted the transfer from the donor’s estate. 111 Medicaid eligibility
therefore represents a second scenario in which the law restrains a donee’s
freedom of inheritance by limiting the consequences of rejection.
In sum, although the donee generally enjoys broad freedom of
inheritance, 112 the law restrains this freedom in various ways. These live
hand restraints fall within one of two general categories: (1) restraints of
acceptance; and (2) restraints of rejection. Restraints of acceptance, such as
the slayer rule, bar the donee from accepting a gift and therefore require the
donee to reject a transfer from the donor’s estate. 113 By contrast, restraints
of rejection, such as the rules that prevent the donee from avoiding federal
tax liens and maintaining Medicaid eligibility by disclaiming a gift, limit the
108. Troy, 116 Md. App at 478, 697 A.2d at 117–18.
109. Id. at 479, 697 A.2d at 118.
110. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 157 (“Although the court held the disclaimer
valid, it suggested that the amounts passing to the sisters could be subject to a claim by the state for
reimbursement of [the donee’s] Medicaid expenses.”); Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1899 (“The wouldbe disclaimant in a Medicaid case retains the right to disclaim. The question instead concerns the
consequences of his or her disclaimer. Lawmakers can concede the right to disclaim . . . but at the
same time insist that the scope of government obligations . . . is instead up to the will of the
people.”); Hirsch, supra note 5, at 602–03 (“Though the competent disclaimant remains ‘free’ to
act, her eligibility for future benefits will be determined as if the disclaimer had not occurred. Thus,
the disclaimant winds up in essentially the same position as under a rule denying her the right to
disclaim in the first place.”).
111. For a list of cases holding similarly, see Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1897 n.134. See, e.g., In
re Molloy v. Bane, 631 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (“The instant appeal presents a
collision of two irreconcilable rules of law. On the one hand, there is a generally recognized right
to renounce any and all testamentary or intestate distributions, even when to do so would frustrate
one’s creditors. On the other hand, public aid is limited and should be spent only on the truly needy.
Here, we hold that the policy considerations underlying the latter rule are of paramount importance.
Accordingly, while one may renounce a testamentary or intestate disposition, such a renunciation is
not without its consequences for purpose of calculating eligibility for Medicaid.”).
112. See supra Section I.B.
113. See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text.
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consequences of the donee’s decision to reject a gift and therefore, make it
more likely that the donee will accept a transfer from the donor’s estate. 114
Thus, both restraints of acceptance and restraints of rejection limit live hand
control of inheritance.
B. Rationales
As explained previously, freedom of inheritance promotes the socially
optimal distribution of property. 115 However, under certain conditions, it is
possible that the donee might exercise their discretion to accept or reject a
transfer in a way that undermines this social welfare goal. Therefore, while
the law generally grants the donee broad freedom of inheritance, it places
restraints on this freedom that can be characterized as potentially addressing
three general concerns that might result in the socially suboptimal
distribution of the donor’s estate: (1) the concern that the donee might not
accurately assess the benefit of a gift from the donor because of the
endowment effect; 116 (2) the concern that broad freedom of inheritance might
incentivize socially detrimental behavior; 117 and (3) the concern that the
donee might exercise their freedom of inheritance in a way that produces
negative externalities. 118
1. Endowment Effect
First, some live hand restrictions might be founded upon concerns
regarding the endowment effect. 119 One assumption that underlies the law’s
grant of freedom of inheritance is that the donee can accurately evaluate the
utility of either accepting a gift or rejecting it. 120 Indeed, the overarching
rationale of freedom of inheritance holds that with the benefit of the
information known at the time the donor dies, the donee can compare the
utility that would be generated from their acceptance of a gift with the utility
that would result from their rejection of it.121 If the donee decides that they
will receive utility from the property, then they will accept the gift.122
Conversely, if the donee decides that the gift would be better placed in the
hands of an alternate donee, then they will disclaim it. 123

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See supra notes 92–111 and accompanying text.
See supra Section I.B.
See infra Section II.B.1.
See infra Section II.B.2.
See infra Section II.B.3.
See infra notes 124–127 and accompanying text.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.B.
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Although the donee can maximize social welfare by exercising their
freedom of inheritance, they may not necessarily accurately value the utility
of a gift. Due to the psychological phenomenon known as the endowment
effect, the donee may undervalue the benefit that they will receive from their
acceptance of the donor’s gift. 124 The endowment effect refers to the idea
that people tend to value things that they possess differently than identical
things that they do not. 125 Specifically, people tend to value property more
highly when they possess it than when they do not, 126 and as a result, they
typically undervalue property that they do not own. 127
The distorted reasoning that the endowment effect causes might
interfere with the underlying rationale of freedom of inheritance. Because
the donee does not yet possess the property that is the subject of the donor’s
gift, the donee might underestimate the utility that they would receive from
accepting the gift. 128 If the donee does not accurately assess the relative
utility of accepting and rejecting a transfer from the donor, then their exercise
of freedom of inheritance might not increase social welfare, and in fact, it
might actually decrease social welfare.129 As such, some inheritance

124. See Hirsch, supra note 47, at 152–53.
125. See generally WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING
ABOUT THE LAW 209–17 (2007).
126. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227,
1228 (2003) (“The much studied ‘endowment effect’ stands for the principal that people tend to
value goods more when they own them than when they do not. Move a person from a city house to
a country house and, low and behold, he is quite likely to prefer the country house more than he did
when he resided in the city. A consequence of the endowment effect is the ‘offer-asking gap,’ which
is the empirically observed phenomenon that people will often demand a higher price to sell a good
that they possess than they would pay for the same good if they did not possess it at present.”
(footnotes omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1129, 1150 (1986) (“Social psychologists have demonstrated that people sometimes value
things once they have them much more highly than they value the same things when they are owned
by others.”).
127. See Charles B. Craver, The Negotiation Process, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 271, 286 (2003)
(“People who own goods that others wish to purchase tend to overvalue those items, while
individuals who are thinking of buying goods possessed by others tend to undervalue those items.”);
Debra Pogrund Stark, et al., Complex Decision-Making and Cognitive Aging Call for Enhanced
Protection of Seniors Contemplating Reverse Mortgages, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 338 (2014)
(explaining that “endowment effects” occur when “consumers overvalue things that they already
own and undervalue things that they do not”).
128. See Hirsch, supra note 47, at 153 (“Because [they have] not yet taken possession, a
disclaiming beneficiary may well view the transaction not as a (painful) loss, but rather as a
(relatively painless) forgoing of a gain. In consequence, the possibility that [they] will disclaim
without due deliberation looms large[] . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Hirsch, supra note 36, at 36
(“How might the endowment effect affect the treatment of inherited wealth? Well, that depends. If
the beneficiary fails to conceptualize an inheritance as really being ‘[their]’ property, [they] might
be less averse to risking or dissipating it . . . . This phenomenon, I suspect, may help explain the
high frequency of disclaimers of inheritances.” (emphasis omitted)).
129. See Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A Situational
Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 834 n.179 (“[D]onors’ rights to future interests and expectancies
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regulations might be based, in part, upon the idea that the law should not
defer to the donee’s decision to accept or reject a transfer when their decisionmaking process is distorted by the endowment effect.
Of course, the endowment effect does not provide a full explanation of
all live hand restrictions. 130 Firstly, the endowment effect can only be used
to justify restraints of rejection, which, as explained previously, limit the
consequences of the donee’s decision to disclaim a gift. 131 The endowment
effect suggests that the donee will too easily reject a gift because they
undervalue the benefit of acceptance.132 Restraints of rejection therefore
directly address the concerns that the endowment effect raises. By contrast,
the endowment effect cannot explain restraints of acceptance, which require
the donee to reject a gift, 133 as mandatory rejection does not address concerns
regarding the donee’s undervaluation of a gift from the donor.
Secondly, the endowment effect theoretically affects the donee’s ability
to accurately evaluate the utility of accepting or rejecting a gift in all
situations. The law, nevertheless, neither requires the donee to accept all gifts
nor limits the consequences of the donee’s decision to disclaim in all
situations. 134 Instead, the law generally defers to the donee’s decisions to
disclaim, 135 and its restrictions of live hand control are limited. 136
Consequently, the restraints that the law does place on the live hand cannot
be explained solely by the endowment effect, and therefore they must be
founded upon additional policy rationales.
2. Incentives
In addition to the concern that the rationality of the donee’s decisionmaking process might be distorted by the endowment effect, 137 some
restraints of live hand control could be founded upon the basis of
incentivizing socially beneficial behavior. Under this rationale, a restraint of
the donee’s freedom of inheritance is designed, not to ensure that the donee’s
decision maximizes social welfare, but to encourage others to conduct
themselves in ways that maximize social welfare. Consider, for example, the
slayer rule. As explained previously, the slayer rule prevents a killer from
may hold less subjective value, making them readier objects of donors’ generosity, or
overgenerosity.”).
130. In fact, the endowment effect might not be a meaningful explanation of restraints of live
hand control at all. See id. (“[R]ecent experimental studies have called into question the endowment
effect.”).
131. See supra Section II.A.2.
132. See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Section II.A.1.
134. See supra Section I.B.
135. See supra Section I.B.
136. See supra Section II.A.
137. See supra Section II.B.1.
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benefiting from their victim’s estate, which means the killer essentially is
required to disclaim any gift from the slain donor.138 Although this restraint
of acceptance could be founded upon other rationales, 139 it might be designed
to incentivize socially beneficial conduct.
In particular, the slayer rule could be designed to deter killings. 140 If a
prospective donee knows they will not benefit from the donor’s estate if they
were to kill the donor, then the prospective donee might be less likely to
engage in the slaying. 141 As Professor Mary Louise Fellows explains,
“[D]enying succession rights to slayers . . . reinforces criminal punishments
for a felonious killing because the denial deters a person from killing to
succeed to another person’s property.” 142 Thus, the slayer rule could be
justified on the same grounds as the law’s criminal punishment of murder, 143
namely that the killing of another is socially undesirable and consequently
such behavior should be deterred. 144
In addition to the slayer rule, other restraints of live hand control could
be justified on the grounds of incentives. Consider, for instance, the restraint
of rejection that denies the donee the ability to avoid federal tax liens by
disclaiming a gift.145 Under a rationale of incentives, a prospective donee
might be more likely to pay their taxes if they know that the IRS will be able
to reach gifted property regardless of whether they accept or reject the gift.
The increased likelihood of voluntary tax compliance is socially beneficial
138. See supra notes 71–84 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 193–200 and accompanying text.
140. See Kevin Bennardo, Slaying Contingent Beneficiaries, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 31, 37
(2015) (“The slayer rule also deters slaying, although this consequence is so weak that it is rightly
viewed as a collateral benefit of the rule rather than a justification for it.”); Nili Cohen, The Slayer
Rule, 92 B.U. L. REV. 793, 798 (2012) (“The rule reflects criminal-law values of deterrence and
retaliation in attributing paramount importance to life’s integrity and in striving to prevent any
incentive to commit what appears to be a profitable crime.”).
141. See William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REV.
65, 71 (1969) (explaining that without the slayer rule, “a temptation to crime would exist”); Paula
A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV.
257, 275 (1994) (“[T]he slayer rule not only punishes, but presumably deters as well.”); Sneddon,
supra note 16, at 103 (“To the extent that a potential killer is aware of the possible application of
the slayer rule, he or she may be deterred from committing an economically motivated killing.”).
142. Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV.
489, 493 (1986); see Hirsch, supra note 77, at 621 (explaining that deterrence is one policy of the
slayer rule).
143. See Manuel A. Utset, Digital Surveillance and Preventive Policing, 49 CONN. L. REV.
1453, 1459–60 (2017) (“Under the economics approach, the goal of the criminal justice system is
to maximize social welfare. . . . Some crimes, like murder, . . . require total deterrence because they
produce harm that is so serious in nature that it trumps any plausible legitimate benefits to
criminals.”).
144. See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2214 (“[B]y insistently rewarding behavior that the state
deems criminal, the testator’s choice of bequest itself causes social harm, operating perversely to
encourage that behavior. Allowing a testator to override the bar would tend to undermine
deterrence.”).
145. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
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because it reduces the enforcement costs that the government must bear to
meet its revenue goals. 146 Thus, a restraint of live hand control that
encourages the donee to pay their taxes is socially beneficial.
However, like the endowment effect,147 several considerations suggest
that the incentives rationale does not adequately explain the law’s restraints
of the live hand. First, for the law to successfully encourage or deter specific
conduct, those whose behavior the law seeks to influence must be aware of
the law. 148 Whereas other areas of law are squarely concerned with
deterrence of undesirable conduct, 149 inheritance law is not. As Professor
Carla Spivack explains, “The primary purpose of wills law . . . is to effectuate
the testator’s intent . . . . Unlike criminal law, inheritance law does not serve
to deter dangerous or violent crimes or other socially disruptive acts.” 150
Because inheritance law is not specifically designed to deter, a donee is less
likely to understand and consider the consequences of the law’s restraints of
freedom of inheritance when deciding to engage in the conduct that could
possibly be deterred by these restraints. 151
146. See J. T. Manhire, There is No Spoon: Reconsidering the Tax Compliance Puzzle, 17 FLA.
TAX REV. 623, 624–25 (2015) (“Voluntary compliance is fundamental to a government with a selfreporting tax administration policy enforced by a relatively small number of audits. . . . By design,
a self-report or audit tax policy seeks to minimize the number of audits and maximize taxpayer
compliance; that is, the government seeks to spend the minimum amount necessary on audit
enforcement and maximize the level of voluntary tax compliance.”).
147. See supra Section II.B.1.
148. See Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 159, 163 (1994)
(“[P]eople must know the rules if the deterrent threat of sanction is to have an effect: The law
cannot deter people from engaging in conduct that they do not know it prohibits, or compel people
to engage in conduct that they do not know it requires.”). Some scholars have made this point
directly with respect to the slayer rule. See Bennardo, supra note 140, at 39 (“In order for the rule
to deter, the would-be slayer would have to know about the slayer rule and its effect.”); Sneddon,
supra note 16, at 103 (explaining that the slayer rule deters only “[t]o the extent that a potential
killer is aware of the possible application of the slayer rule”).
149. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 672 (1984) (explaining that the “enterprise . . . of regulating
conduct through deterrence” is “central to the criminal law”); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of
Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997)
(“Currently there are two major camps of tort scholars. One understands tort liability as an
instrument aimed largely at the goal of deterrence, commonly explained within the framework of
economics. The other looks at tort law as a way of achieving corrective justice between the
parties.”).
150. Spivack, supra note 16, at 194; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The main function of the law in this
field is to facilitate rather than regulate. The law serves this function by establishing rules under
which sufficiently reliable determinations can be made regarding the content of the donor’s
intention.”); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 1 (“Most of the law of succession is
concerned with enabling posthumous enforcement of the actual intent of the decedent or, failing
this, giving effect to the decedent’s probable intent.”).
151. Several scholars have recognized that the law of succession generally, and specific aspects
of it, are obscure and not widely known or understood. See, e.g., Alexander A. Boni-Saenz,
Distributive Justice and Donative Intent, 65 UCLA L. REV. 324, 338–39 (2018) (“One may have
the motivation to engage in estate planning but lack the resources to do so effectively . . . . One
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Consider, for instance, the slayer rule. 152 While most individuals likely
understand that criminal law imposes penalties on the act of killing, fewer
likely know that inheritance law also imposes penalties on the same conduct.
Similarly, one who fails to satisfy their tax obligations to the federal
government might be aware that such failure has consequences imposed by
both tax law and criminal law. It seems much less likely, however, that they
would independently know that inheritance law imposes additional
consequences to tax delinquency when a federal lien attaches to their
property.
Second, assuming that the donee is aware of the law, live hand restraints
will not influence the donee’s conduct if they do not consider their
consequences when making decisions.153 For instance, the effect of the
slayer rule is to deprive the donee of the economic advantage of killing the
donor, 154 and therefore, to the extent the killer is motivated by monetary
benefit, the slayer rule could have some deterrent effect. 155 However, not all
killers are motivated by pecuniary gain, 156 and in these instances, the loss of
a monetary benefit likely does not significantly influence the slayer’s
decision to kill. 157
important resource is the specialized legal knowledge about formalistic inheritance law doctrines.
This includes not only substantive knowledge of the body of law in a given state but also knowledge
of how to communicate one’s donative preferences in a way that is intelligible to the state’s probate
system. . . . [B]ecause donors are one-time players in the game of life and death, . . . this type of
knowledge is likely to be rare in the population.”); Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson,
Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1941) (“It is extremely improbable that
laymen would be aware of the legal rules concerning the competency of attesting witnesses without
legal advice . . . .”); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1055 (2004) (“Intestacy law is . . . relatively obscure.”);
Weisbord, supra note 24, at 906 (“[T]he testamentary process is obscure, unfamiliar, and
complex.”).
152. See supra Section II.A.1.
153. See Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
283, 309 (2007) (“The deterrence theory rests on [an] assumption[][that] . . . criminals weigh the
costs and the benefits of their actions before committing a crime.” (citing Paul H. Robinson & John
M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worse When
Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953 (2003)).
154. See supra Section II.A.1.
155. See Sneddon, supra note 16, at 103 (explaining that, if the donee is aware of the slayer rule,
the donee “may be deterred from committing an economically motivated killing”).
156. For example, instances of mercy killings and assisted suicide likely do not entail
motivations of monetary gain. See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to
Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803 (1993).
157. See Bennardo, supra note 140, at 39 (“[M]any slayers do not have inheritance on the mind;
the slayer rule would not act as a strong deterrent on those killers.”); Sherman, supra note 156, at
873 (“[T]he slayer rule can have a deterrent effect, but only with respect to a person contemplating
homicide for the purpose of inheriting from the victim; a potential killer with a different motive
would not be deterred by the thought of losing an inheritance.”). “Note, however, that the slayer
rule could still have some deterrent effect in cases of non-greed killings, just as any negative
consequence carries some measure of deterrence regardless of whether it is related to the motive for
the crime.” Bennardo, supra note 140, at 39 n.39.
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While the slayer rule might have some deterrent effect for a prospective
killer who is motivated by money, the law’s restraint of rejection in the
context of federal tax liens likely produces an even weaker incentive because
the inability to disclaim would seem to be of little concern to a donee at the
time they decide whether to satisfy their tax obligations. To begin with, the
inability to disclaim would only affect the donee’s tax payment if they truly
are deciding whether to pay. If the donee’s failure to pay tax is due to mistake
or ignorance of their obligations, then the potential negative consequence of
restrained freedom of inheritance likely has no effect on the donee’s conduct.
Likewise, if the donee’s failure to pay is due to financial inability, then the
threat of attachment of federal tax liens to a future inheritance likely does not
increase the likelihood of payment. If, however, the donee is considering
whether to intentionally evade paying their taxes, then the law’s restraint of
freedom of inheritance could potentially serve as an incentive to pay.
Nevertheless, even for a donee who is affirmatively contemplating tax
evasion, the inability to disclaim an inheritance likely is not a meaningful
consideration due to the general uncertainty of a future inheritance. Because
the donor can change their estate plan at any time during life, 158 a prospective
tax evader has no guarantee that they will be entitled to an inheritance at the
time of the donor’s death. The donee’s inheritance therefore remains
uncertain after the donee’s decision either to pay tax or to evade it. 159
Because a prospective tax evader will not necessarily experience the negative
consequences of restrained freedom of inheritance, such restraint likely does
not serve as a meaningful incentive to make tax payments.
Finally, even if the donee is aware of the law and considers its
consequences, their conduct will not be significantly influenced by live hand
restraints if the law imposes other, more effective, disincentives. In this
regard, the criminal law already strongly disincentivizes the conduct that is
the focus of the slayer rule, namely the killing of the donor by the donee. 160
If the donee is not deterred from killing by the threat of extended
incarceration or even potential execution, then they likely will not be deterred
by the possibility of losing an inheritance. Similarly, federal law already
158. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 342; Hirsch, supra note 5, at 613.
159. This uncertainty stands in contrast to the certainty of the donee’s inheritance in situations
that the slayer rule applies. The slayer’s act of killing the donor is the event that triggers the slayer’s
inheritance, and therefore the donor has no opportunity to change their estate plan after the donee’s
actions. See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2214 (“[T]he speed of the assault typically stymies formal
disinheritance of the slayer.”); Hirsch, supra note 77, at 620 (explaining that the slayer rule
“impute[s] a change of intent that did come about, . . . but that the testator had no opportunity to
express”).
160. See Bennardo, supra note 140, at 39 (“The criminal law establishes harsh penalties to deter
intentional killings, and these punishments likely already have a strong deterrent effect on wouldbe killers.”); see also Sherman, supra note 156, at 873 (“[W]ith respect to mercy killing, the slayer
rule affords no additional deterrence, and, should society think deterrence necessary for such cases,
the criminal law is surely adequate.”).
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disincentivizes the intentional nonpayment of tax by threat of monetary fines
and imprisonment. 161 If one contemplating tax evasion is not deterred by the
possibility of these criminal sanctions, then they might not be deterred by
their inability to avoid federal tax liens through the disclaimer of future
inheritances.
In sum, although live hand restraints might have some deterrent
effect, 162 the incentives rationale alone does not adequately justify them.
Some scholars have expressly recognized the subordinate nature of the
incentives rational in the context of the slayer rule.163 For example, Professor
Kevin Bennardo explains that one cannot “say that the slayer rule never
deters,” but “the deterrent effect of the rule is so weak that it cannot and
should not be the primary justification for the rule.” 164 The same
considerations that indicate deterrence is a collateral consequence and not a
primary justification of the slayer rule also suggest that an incentives
rationale is not an adequate justification of other live hand restraints. Thus,
the law’s restraints of freedom of inheritance must be founded upon
additional policy concerns.
3. Negative Externalities
Finally, the law’s restraints of the live hand could be designed to address
concerns regarding negative externalities. 165 The donee’s freedom of
inheritance is founded upon the rationale that the donee can evaluate the costs
and benefits of accepting or rejecting a gift from the donor, and the donee
can make the decision that produces the greatest utility. 166 In some situations,
however, the donee’s decision to accept or reject a gift from the donor
imposes costs on others that are not borne by the donee. If the donee does
not consider these costs, then they will not accurately weigh the costs and
benefits of their decision, and, consequently, their decision to accept or reject
a gift might not maximize social welfare.
The costs of a decision that are not borne by the decisionmaker are
known as negative externalities, and the paradigmatic example of how
161. I.R.C. § 7201 (2012) (“Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by
law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000
($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than [five] years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution.”).
162. See supra notes 140–146 and accompanying text.
163. See Bennardo, supra note 140, at 39 (“The slayer rule produces some measure of
deterrence, albeit likely a small one. . . . Deterrence . . . fits better as a collateral benefit of the slayer
rule than a justification for it.”); Sneddon, supra note 16, at 103 (“Deterrence of criminal behavior
is often listed as a public policy goal of the slayer rule. Yet, deterrence is only a side effect of the
slayer rule rather than a policy goal.”).
164. Bennardo, supra note 140, at 40.
165. See infra note 172.
166. See supra Section I.B.
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negative externalities can render an individual’s decision suboptimal from a
social welfare standpoint involves pollution. 167 When a businessperson
decides to continue producing goods at their manufacturing plant, they will
weigh the private costs—namely the costs of labor and materials—with the
private benefits—specifically the revenue generated from production. 168 If
these private benefits outweigh the private costs, then the businessperson will
make the decision to continue operations. 169
However, just because the decision to continue production is best for
the businessperson as an individual does not mean the decision maximizes
social welfare. This discrepancy stems from the possibility that the decision
to continue production might impose costs on others that the businessperson
does not necessarily factor into their decision. Specifically, production at the
manufacturing plant could result in negative externalities in the form of
pollution. 170 When the social costs of pollution are factored into the analysis,
the socially optimal decision might be to close the manufacturing plant,
despite the private benefits of production outweighing the private costs. 171
Therefore, as exemplified by the pollution producing business, negative
externalities can cause socially detrimental activity to occur when individual
decisionmakers do not internalize all societal costs.
Like the businessperson’s decision to continue manufacturing
operations, the donee’s decision to accept or reject a gift from the donor could
have societal costs that render their decision suboptimal from a social welfare

167. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 300
(2007) (“Environmental pollution is an archetypal example of an externality. Acme Factory
produces widgets and in doing so emits pollutants into the environment. People living downstream
or downwind from Acme receive the pollutants and bear some costs as a result. These costs are
external to Acme’s decision to produce widgets . . . .”).
168. See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1650 (2011) (“In
deciding whether to open a factory or increase production, a firm will compare its private benefits
and costs but may ignore the social costs of pollution on local residents, other countries, or future
generations.”).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1649–50 (“[S]elf-interested individuals and profit-maximizing firms use their
property for various purposes, and, in doing so, these individuals and firms may impose external
effects on others. That is, a party may undertake an activity that has not only private benefits and
costs, which directly affect the party engaging in the activity, but also social effects, which affect
the welfare of other parties. If these social effects are beneficial, the activity entails positive
externalities; if these social effects are harmful, the activity entails negative externalities.” (footnote
omitted)).
171. See id. at 1651 (“Operating the factory may be socially undesirable, even if the firm has a
private incentive to operate the factory, if the social costs of operating the factory, including the
external costs of the pollution, exceed the social benefits of manufacturing . . . .”). It is important
to note that just because an activity produces negative externalities does not mean that the activity
is socially undesirable. See id. (“[O]perating the factory may be socially desirable, despite the
external costs of the pollution, if the social benefits of manufacturing . . . exceed the social costs of
operating the factory, including the external costs of the pollution.”).
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perspective. 172 One particular context in which the donor might exercise their
freedom of inheritance without considering the societal costs of their decision
involves federal tax liens. Indeed, a donee’s decision to disclaim gifts in
order to avoid the federal government’s seizure of the gifted property in
satisfaction of their tax liabilities might produce negative externalities that
warrant the law’s restriction of their ability to do so. 173 However, before one
can understand why a donor’s avoidance of federal tax liens through the
exercise of freedom of inheritance might produce negative externalities, one
must first understand why the donor’s decision to disclaim property in order
to avoid the claims of ordinary creditors does not produce negative
externalities.
Although the law restricts the donee’s ability to avoid federal tax liens
through the exercise of freedom of inheritance, 174 it allows the donee to
disclaim gifts to avoid the claims of ordinary creditors. 175 The law allows the
donee to divert gifted property away from ordinary creditors because the
donee’s decision to do so does not produce negative externalities. When a
creditor decides to extend credit, the price it charges reflects the risk of
default, 176 which depends upon a variety of factors including the debtor’s
credit history, their available resources, and any collateral pledged as

172. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1881 (suggesting that federal regulation of the donee’s ability
to disclaim might be appropriate in instances in which “disclaimers . . . leave citizens impecunious”
and consequently “could damage the financial interests of the federal government”); Weisbord,
supra note 16, at 1252–61 (recognizing harms to governmental interests as potential externalities
that are addressed by restrictions on the donee’s ability to disclaim to avoid federal tax liens and to
maintain Medicaid eligibility). The idea that the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance could
produce negative externalities is an extension of the notion that the donor’s exercise of freedom of
disposition could do so. See Glover, supra note 10, at 328 (“[T]he decision-maker, whether the
donor or the donee, might not make decisions that maximize social welfare, and the law therefore
restricts both freedom of disposition and freedom of inheritance in ways that are designed to limit
the negative externalities that are produced by the exercise of these freedoms.”); see also Hirsch,
supra note 13, at 2204 (“[E]conomic analysis—applicable . . . to . . . freedom of testation—
potentially justifies nullification only of conditions that involve irreversible choices or that entail
tangible spillover costs.”); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1161 (“Externalities . . . may arise because of a
disposition of property at death.”); Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1230 (“Mandatory restrictions on
dispositional freedom are minimal and mostly confined to transfers that generate contexts where
regulation is necessary to minimize spillover costs or harm to private, non-consenting third
parties.”).
173. See infra notes 181–185 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 93–100 and accompanying text.
175. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 142 (“Suppose A disclaims her interest in
O’s estate. Most cases have held that A’s ordinary creditors cannot reach the disclaimed property.”).
176. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1883 (“Commercial lenders are voluntary creditors. They
extend credit to borrowers or offer purchase-money credit fully aware of the risk of incidental
default—but by maintaining a portfolio of debt, voluntary creditors can spread risk. The interest
rates they charge reflect the risk of default, ensuring (within an acceptable margin of error) that they
will profit in the aggregate.”).
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security. 177 Notably absent from the creditor’s consideration is the donee’s
inheritance prospects.
Because it is subject to the whims and solvency of the donor, 178 an
inheritance is so uncertain that a creditor will not consider it as a possible
source of satisfaction of debts, and the prospect of an inheritance will
therefore not be reflected in the price of credit. 179 As such, the donee’s
decision to disclaim and shift gifted property away from ordinary creditors
does not impose a cost upon these creditors because they have been
compensated for bearing the risk that the donee will inherit nothing from the
donor. As Professor Hirsch puts differently, because “[t]he expectancy of
inheritance [is] not [] reflected in the price of credit,” creditors “would
receive, literally, more than they bargained for” if they “stood in a position
to prevent disclaimers by insolvents.” 180
Because freedom of inheritance does not raise negative externality
concerns for most insolvent donees, the law typically allows the donee to
reject a transfer from the donor and divert the gift away from their creditors.
However, one exception to this general rule involves a donee who owes back
taxes to the federal government. 181 As explained previously, the Supreme
Court has held that, even when the donee effectively exercises their right to
reject a gift under state law, “the disclaimer d[oes] not defeat . . . federal tax
liens.” 182 Although it did not frame its decision in this way, the Supreme
Court essentially ruled that federal tax law places a restraint of rejection on
the donee’s freedom of inheritance that limits the consequences of their
decision to disclaim.

177. See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 614 (“Consumer credit dossiers normally report the debtor’s
credit history, income, assets, debts and obligations. Creditors who finance large purchases
generally protect themselves by demanding a security interest in collateral and consequently can
disregard the debtor’s other resources.” (footnote omitted)).
178. See id. at 613 (“A will is ambulatory, and while the life-span of the testator can be
actuarially estimated, thereby indicating the extent to which interests created under the will must be
discounted, the probability that the testator will revoke his will before it ‘matures’ depends upon
idiosyncrasy, and hence is indeterminate.”). In addition to the uncertainty of an inheritance, other
considerations might dissuade creditors from considering a debtor’s inheritance prospects. See id.
(“Few debtors have the requisite information at their fingertips; efforts to obtain the information
would be inefficient, significantly increasing transaction costs.”).
179. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1883 (“[V]oluntary lenders seldom rely on debtors’ prospects
of inheritance when they set the price of credit.”); Hirsch, supra note 47, at 158 (“[V]oluntary
creditors almost certainly will not have relied on a debtor’s prospects of inheritance when they set
the price of credit.”); Hirsch, supra note 5, at 614. (“[E]vidence indicates that creditors ordinarily
show little interest in their debtors’ expectancies.”).
180. Hirsch, supra note 5, at 614.
181. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 142–43.
182. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999); see supra notes 93–100 and accompanying
text.
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A potential rationale for this restraint of rejection is that the use of a
disclaimer to avoid federal tax liens generates negative externalities. 183
Specifically, the donee likely does not consider that their avoidance of federal
tax liens through their exercise of freedom of inheritance might increase the
tax burden of all taxpayers. Professor Hirsch explains that “[t]he federal Joint
Committee on Taxation takes the incidence of expected tax delinquency into
account when estimating revenues from a given tax and its rate structure,
allowing Congress to meet its revenue goals regardless of delinquency.” 184
Under this line of reasoning, when tax authorities have greater ability to
enforce individual tax obligations, the tax rate can be lowered and revenue
goals will still be met. Conversely, when tax authorities have lesser ability
to enforce individual tax obligations, the tax rate must be raised to meet
revenue goals.
If tax rates increase because of donees’ decisions to disclaim
inheritances, the additional tax liability of others required to meet Congress’s
revenue goals represents a negative externality flowing from the exercise of
freedom of inheritance. Within this context, the prohibition on the use of
disclaimers to avoid federal tax liens can be seen as an enforcement tool for
tax authorities that increases the amount of tax collected and therefore
reduces the tax rate that must be imposed on others. 185 Put differently, a
restraint of live hand control in the context of federal tax liens can be founded
upon the rationale that it minimizes the costs of the donee’s decision that are
borne, not by the donee, but by others.
In addition to the situation in which a donee attempts to avoid federal
tax liens by disclaiming an inheritance, another situation in which restraint
of the live hand might be justified on negative externality grounds involves
Medicaid eligibility. Medicaid is a governmental assistance program that
provides healthcare benefits to individuals with limited financial
resources. 186 Because the donee’s Medicaid eligibility is dependent upon
their ability to pay for their own medical expenses, an inheritance could affect
their eligibility for assistance. Indeed, the possibility arises that a donee will
183. See Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1258 (“Tax lien disclaimers undermine the government’s
financial interest by allowing disclaimants to protect inherited property from tax collection.”).
184. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1884 (footnote omitted); see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ABOUT
JOINT
COMMITTEE
ON
TAXATION
10,
THE
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1174 (last accessed Sept. 5, 2019)
(“The Joint Committee . . . examine[s] compliance, administration, and enforcement issues that
could affect the timing or amounts of revenues collected as part of the process of understanding how
a proposal would operate. When these issues are likely to be important to a proposal, the Joint
Committee staff accounts for their effects in the revenue estimate.”).
185. See Bender, supra note 51, at 901 (“When they avoid tax liens, disclaimants frustrate the
government’s ability to collect outstanding tax obligations.”); Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1259
(“[T]he failure of state law disclaimer statutes to protect the governmental interest in tax
collection . . . forced federal courts to find ways to override state wealth transfer law.”).
186. See Miller, supra note 101, at 46–47.
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maintain Medicaid eligibility if they were to disclaim an inheritance but lose
eligibility if they were to accept the gift from the donor’s estate.187
The law generally tolerates broad live hand control of inheritance, but,
as explained previously, it restricts freedom of inheritance in the context of
Medicaid eligibility. 188 More particularly, it does so indirectly, as the donee
can reject a gift while receiving Medicaid benefits. 189 However, the
disclaimed property is considered when the donee’s Medicaid eligibility is
calculated. 190 Thus, the law does not directly restrain live hand control in this
situation because the donee can still decide to reject a gift. Instead, the law
indirectly restrains freedom of inheritance by eliminating some of the
consequences of the donee’s decision to disclaim.
The rationale underlying this restraint of rejection is similar to the
rationale of the restraint of the live hand in the context of federal tax liens, as
both are designed to address a problem of negative externalities. 191 As
explained previously, if donees were able to avoid federal tax liens by
disclaiming, the general public would have to contribute more in order for
the government to meet its budgetary goals. 192 Likewise, if donees were able
to maintain Medicaid eligibility by disclaiming, the general public’s tax
burden would have to increase in order to cover the increased cost of
Medicaid programs. 193 Under either scenario, the cost of the donee’s
187. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1896 (“Medicaid provides medical benefits to citizens in
financial distress. An inheritance relieves that distress and can cause a citizen to become ineligible
for Medicaid. In turn, a beneficiary might disclaim an inheritance in an effort to maintain his or her
eligibility.”).
188. See supra notes 101–111 and accompanying text.
189. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1897 n.110.
190. See id. at 1897 n.134.
191. See id. at 1896 (noting the scenario of a donee disclaiming an inheritance to maintain
Medicaid eligibility “resembles the problem of disclaimers thwarting the tax commissioner, in that
they can function to create (as opposed to leave unsatisfied) a government liability. Either way,
disclaimers would take a toll on the public fisc”); Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1255 (“Two contexts
implicate the governmental interest in disclaimer law: (1) where the government provides public
assistance (Medicaid, in particular) . . . and (2) where a disclaimant has outstanding tax liens . . . .
Disclaimers [in these contexts] interfere with the government’s allocation and collection of public
financial resources . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
192. See supra notes 184–185 and accompanying text.
193. See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 602 (“[D]isclaimer by the devisee would have resulted in her
continued dependence upon Medicaid payments, whereas ‘the purpose of [Medicaid is] to aid only
economically disadvantaged persons; the economic viability of the Medicaid program itself can be
maintained only if eligibility requirements are diligently observed.’” (second alteration in original));
Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1898 (“In crafting that law, the rationale for suppression of Medicaid
planning is clear. The program exists to benefit the ‘truly needy,’ not those who ‘created their own
need,’ as one court has put it. If allowed to determine Medicaid eligibility, disclaimers would
impose an ‘unnecessar[y] . . . burden’ on taxpayers.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted));
Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1257 (“From the governmental interest perspective, states should be
proactive in enacting mandatory rules that prohibit Medicaid disclaimers because allowing
individuals with access to private resources increases the cost of a Medicaid program already
threatened by the possibility of significant long-term budget cuts.”).
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decision falls on society as a whole, rather than on the individual
decisionmaker. As a result, the donee might not make a decision that
maximizes social welfare, and the law therefore restricts their ability to
maintain Medicaid eligibility through the exercise of freedom of inheritance.
In addition to the restraints of rejection that the law places on the
donee’s freedom of inheritance, the law’s primary restraint of acceptance,
known as the slayer rule, could also be founded upon negative externality
concerns. As explained above, the slayer rule prevents a donee from
accepting a gift from a donor whom the donee kills, and it therefore
essentially requires the slayer to disclaim any interest in their victim’s
estate. 194 Scholars generally do not describe the slayer rule as addressing the
problem of the donee imposing costs on others, 195 but instead they typically
explain that the slayer rule prevents the killer from enjoying an undeserved
benefit. Put differently, the slayer rule is typically explained as preventing
the killer’s unjust enrichment.196
Consider, for example, the justification of the slayer rule found in the
Restatement. It explains, “The rationale for the slayer rule is the prevention
of unjust enrichment, in accord with the maxim that a wrongdoer cannot
profit from [their] wrong. Any enrichment accruing to a slayer from the
wrong is unjust and is not allowed.” 197 From the Restatement’s perspective,
the inheritance a slayer receives flows directly from their act of killing, and
it would therefore be unjust for the slayer to benefit from their wrongful

194. See supra Section II.A.1.
195. In addition to focusing on potential negative externalities generated by the donee’s exercise
of freedom of inheritance, an analysis of the slayer rule can also focus on potential negative
externalities generated by the donor’s exercise of freedom of disposition. See Glover, supra note
13, at 449.
196. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 136 (“The slayer rule . . . is an
application of the law of restitution and unjust enrichment.”); William M. McGovern, Jr., supra
note 141, at 65 (“Today, most jurisdictions bar a killer from succeeding to his victim’s property.
The traditional rationale for that result is that a criminal should not be allowed to enrich himself by
his crime.”); Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement and Its Critics, 65 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 933, 937 (2008) (“This blackletter rule is a broad statement that the unjust enrichment
principle overrides the victim’s testamentary disposition or the intestacy statute in order to prevent
the slayer from profiting from his wrong. Today its major point is not controversial.” (footnote
omitted)).
197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. b
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). The Uniform Probate Code also suggests that the rationale of the slayer
rule is founded upon unjust enrichment concerns. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(f) (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) (“A wrongful acquisition of property or
interest by a killer not covered by this section must be treated in accordance with the principle that
a killer cannot profit from his [or her] wrong.”). Likewise, the Restatement of Restitution explains
that the slayer rule prevents unjust enrichment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2011) (“A slayer’s acquisition, enlargement, or
accelerated possession of an interest in property as a result of the victim’s death constitutes unjust
enrichment that the slayer will not be allowed to retain.”).
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conduct. Consequently, the law prevents the killer from benefiting from their
victim.
Unjust enrichment is the typical explanation of the slayer rule, but it is
not the only conceivable explanation. Indeed, the slayer rule’s unjust
enrichment rationale can be reframed as a rationale based upon negative
externalities. From this alternate perspective, the slayer’s benefit should not
be characterized as resulting from their act of killing, but instead it should be
seen as flowing from the donor’s estate-planning decisions. After all, if the
donor did not exercise their freedom of disposition in favor of the slayer, then
the slayer would receive nothing from the victim’s estate regardless of the
victim’s cause of death. When reframed in this way, the problem with the
slayer’s benefit is not that it is the result of wrongful conduct and therefore
unjust. 198 Instead, the problem is that the slayer’s gift might be contrary to
the donor’s actual intent. 199 The slayer’s act of killing the donor raises
questions regarding whether the donor truly intended to benefit the slayer
despite that the intent expressed through their estate-planning decisions
suggests that they did. 200
More particularly, if the donor had known that the slayer would kill
them, then the donor might not have made estate-planning decisions that
benefited the slayer. 201 The donor instead might have preferred to benefit
others. If the donor indeed did not intend to benefit their killer, then the
slayer’s acceptance of the gift generates negative externalities because the
donor’s intended beneficiaries are deprived of the gift. The deprivation of an
intended benefit can be seen as a cost of the donee’s exercise of freedom of
inheritance that is borne by the donor’s intended beneficiaries and not by the
slayer. More broadly, the disposition of the donor’s property in ways
contrary to their intent also imposes costs on society as a whole because the
law in this area is founded upon the idea that freedom of disposition and, in

198. See Sherman, supra note 156, at 861 (“When one examines the[] . . . untoward effects
produced by a slayer’s actions, one sees that they are not morally objectionable except insofar as
they frustrate intentions we are otherwise disposed to honor.”).
199. See Fellows, supra note 142, at 493–94 (“Only if the law denies slayers the right to succeed
to their victims’ property can the law ameliorate potential disruptions to property transfers and
protect donative freedom . . . .”); Sherman, supra note 156, at 860–62 (“[T]he [slayer] rule is
designed to preserve the integrity of our property-transfer system by preventing a person from
altering, by means of a wrongful slaying, the course of property succession as intended by the source
of the property. . . . In other words, [the donor’s] intent is the key.”).
200. See Cohen, supra note 140, at 799 (“The murderer’s illegal act creates an extreme change
of circumstances regarding the order of succession. The testator’s intention to benefit the slayer . . .
now seems detached from reality. Another distribution of assets is needed.” (footnote omitted));
Simmons, supra note 77, at 131 (“Legislators might reasonably assume that most people would not
desire that their killer inherit part or all of their estate.”).
201. See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2214 (explaining that the slayer rule “adjusts the estate plan
to the probable intent of the victim in most instances, for testators rarely wish to provide for their
assassins; only the speed of the assault typically stymies formal disinheritance of the slayer”).
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turn, fulfillment of the donor’s intent, is socially beneficial. 202 Thus, when
framed in this way, the slayer rule can be characterized, not as preventing the
unjust enrichment of the slayer, but as minimizing the costs imposed on the
donor’s intended beneficiaries and upon society as a whole.
In sum, the law grants the donee freedom of inheritance because the
donee’s ability to decide for themselves whether to accept or reject a gift is
seen as maximizing social welfare. 203 Nonetheless, the law restrains the live
hand in certain circumstances, 204 and, like the law’s general deference to live
hand control, these restrictions can be analyzed from a social welfare
perspective. 205 In this regard, the law’s live hand restraints can be seen as
limiting freedom of inheritance in situations that raise particular concerns
regarding the donee’s ability to evaluate the costs and benefits of their
decision to accept or reject a gift. In particular, the law’s restraints of
freedom of inheritance primarily can be seen as addressing concerns
regarding negative externalities. 206 Additionally, some of the law’s restraints
of live hand control could also have collateral consequences that are socially
desirable, such as combatting the endowment effect and incentivizing
socially beneficial behavior. 207 From this perspective, the law’s restraints of
freedom of inheritance can be viewed as mechanisms that maximize social
welfare.
III. INCONSISTENCY IN THE DEGREE OF RESTRAINT
Two important observations should be gleaned from the foregoing
social welfare analysis of the law’s live hand restraints. First, both the law’s
restraints of acceptance and its restraints of rejection are primarily justified
as minimizing negative externalities.208 Under this rationale, the donee
should not be able to decide whether to accept a gift or to reject it when such
a decision imposes costs on others that the donee likely does not consider
when making their decision. 209 If the donee does not consider all of the costs
that their exercise of freedom of inheritance might generate, then the law
should not presume that the donee will make decisions that maximize social
welfare and therefore restraint of live hand control is warranted.
While this first important takeaway focuses on the similarities between
the law’s restraints of acceptance and its restraints of rejection, the second
focuses on inconsistencies between the two, specifically in the degree to
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.3.
See supra Sections II.B.1–2.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.3.
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which they restrain live hand control. Although all live hand restraints
primarily pursue the same policy objectives, the way in which the law
implements restraints of acceptance differs significantly from the way in
which it implements restraints of rejection. On the one hand, the law’s
restraints of rejection leave the donee’s freedom of inheritance largely intact
but place limited restraints on the donee’s ability to disclaim that are precisely
designed to address negative externality concerns.210 On the other hand, the
law’s traditional restraint of acceptance, namely the slayer rule, broadly
limits the donee’s freedom of inheritance by completely denying the donee
the ability to accept a gift. 211 In other words, the law’s restraints of rejection
are partial, but the law’s primary restraint of acceptance is absolute.
A. Partial Restraints
Partial restraints of rejection maximize social welfare because they are
narrowly tailored to maintain the donee’s freedom of inheritance while at the
same time minimizing negative externalities. Consider the law’s restraints
of rejection that limit the donee’s ability to disclaim to avoid federal tax liens
and to maintain Medicaid eligibility. 212 In both contexts, the donee’s
rejection of a gift imposes costs on taxpayers who must contribute more in
order for the government to meet its budgetary goals. 213 Despite this
possibility of negative externalities, the law does not absolutely bar the donee
from disclaiming. Instead, the donee can exercise their freedom of
inheritance by rejecting the gift, but the consequences of that decision are
altered to address the externality concerns. 214
For example, when the donee’s property is subject to federal tax liens,
the law allows the donee to disclaim their interest in the donor’s estate, but
the liens remain with the disclaimed property. 215 Because the donee’s
disclaimer does not affect federal tax liens, the IRS can seek recourse for the
donee’s unpaid taxes from property that is not owned by the donee.216 This
partial restraint of rejection maximizes social welfare because it is
specifically designed to address negative externality concerns while leaving
the donee’s freedom of inheritance otherwise intact.

210. See supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.3.
211. See supra Section II.A.1.
212. See supra notes 93–111 and accompanying text.
213. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1898; Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1252–61.
214. See supra Section II.A.2.
215. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 142–43; Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1885–87.
216. See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Nationwide Uniformity and the Common Law of Federal
Taxation, 66 TAX LAW. 1, 47 (2012) (summarizing the holding in Drye and stating “[e]ven though
the heir never owned the disclaimed inheritance so far as creditors were concerned under state law,
the Court ruled that the Service was entitled to the property in preference to the recipients under the
disclaimer”).
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Imagine a scenario in which the donee’s outstanding tax liability is
$100,000, and the IRS has levied tax liens against the donee’s property. If
the donor dies leaving $50,000 to the donee, the law’s restraint of rejection
is effectively absolute because the IRS can seek satisfaction of the donee’s
outstanding tax liability up to the full amount of the gifted property regardless
of whether the donee accepts or rejects the gift. Under either scenario, the
gifted property is subject to the IRS’s claims, and the property will benefit
neither the donee nor the alternate donee. This result maximizes social
welfare because the potential cost imposed on the tax paying public by the
donee’s decision to disclaim is equal to the amount of the gifted property.
By contrast, if instead of leaving the donee $50,000, the donor leaves
the donee $200,000, then the donee has a real choice whether to accept or
reject a portion of the gift. If the donee accepts the gift, the IRS can seek
recourse for the $100,000 tax liability from the accepted property, but the
donee is left with the remaining $100,000. Likewise, if the donee rejects the
gift, the IRS can seek recourse from the property up to the $100,000 tax
liability, but the alternate donee is left with $100,000 after the IRS exercises
its remedies. Thus, the IRS’s ability to seek recourse for the donee’s
outstanding tax liability against gifted property regardless of whether the
donee accepts or rejects the gift addresses negative externality concerns, but
the donee retains the ability to exercise freedom of inheritance over property
above and beyond their tax delinquency. By maintaining the donee’s
freedom of inheritance in this partially restrained fashion, the law allows the
donee to make the decision to accept or reject at least a portion of the gifted
property.
Similarly, when the donee is eligible for Medicaid benefits, the law
allows the donee to disclaim gifts from the donor’s estate, but if the donee
does in fact disclaim those gifts, their Medicaid eligibility is calculated as if
they accepted the gift. 217 Thus, like the IRS can seek recourse from
disclaimed property owned by someone other than the donee when that
property is subject to federal tax liens, disclaimed property that is not owned
by the donee can affect the donee’s eligibility for Medicaid assistance. 218
This partial restraint of rejection increases social welfare because it largely
leaves the donee’s freedom of inheritance in place while at the same time
addressing negative externality concerns. Because the donee’s Medicaid
eligibility is affected regardless of whether the donee accepts or rejects the
gift, their decision to disclaim will not require the taxpaying public to

217. See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 602–03, see also supra notes 101–111 and accompanying text.
218. See Troy v. Hart, 116 Md. App. 468, 476–80, 697 A.2d 113, 117–18 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1997).
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contribute more to fund Medicaid programs. 219 Moreover, after considering
the effect of the gifted property on their Medicaid eligibility, the donee can
evaluate whether they or the alternate donee will receive greater utility from
gifted property.
In sum, the law’s restraints of rejection are not absolute. In the contexts
described above, the donee can exercise freedom of inheritance by
disclaiming their interest in the donor’s estate, but the law places partial
restraints of rejection that alter the consequences of the donee’s decision.
These alterations to the effect of a disclaimer specifically address negative
externality concerns, and the donee’s freedom of inheritance remains
otherwise intact. In this way, partial restraints of rejection maximize social
welfare.
B. Absolute Restraints
The limited nature of the law’s restraints of rejection stands in stark
contrast to the absoluteness of its restraint of acceptance in the context of a
murderous donee. As explained previously, the law’s primary restraint of
acceptance is the slayer rule, which prohibits a donee who intentionally kills
the donor from benefiting from the donor’s estate. 220 Like the law’s restraints
of rejection, this restraint of acceptance primarily is designed to minimize
negative externalities. 221 However, unlike the law’s restraints of rejection,
the traditional slayer rule is absolute, denying the donee the freedom to accept
in all situations in which the donee intentionally kills the donor. Once the
absolute character of the slayer rule is recognized, the issue becomes whether
an absolute restraint of acceptance can be justified upon externality concerns.
The externalities that the slayer rule attempts to avoid stem from the
probable intent of the donor. 222 Although the donor made estate-planning
decisions that benefited their killer, the donor might have preferred to benefit
others had the donor known that their chosen beneficiary would kill them. 223
If the donor would have preferred to benefit beneficiaries other than their
killer, the killer’s exercise of freedom of inheritance by accepting the gift
from their victim deprives the donor’s intended beneficiaries of a portion of
their estate. The deprivation of an intended beneficiary’s gift represents a
cost of the killer’s decision to accept a gift from their victim that is borne by
the donor’s intended beneficiary. 224 More broadly, by undermining the

219. Even if the donee incorrectly receives Medicaid benefits after a disclaimer, the recipient of
the disclaimed property may be liable for reimbursement of the improper benefits received by the
donee. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 144–45.
220. See supra Section II.A.1.
221. See supra Section II.B.3.
222. See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
223. See Cohen, supra note 140, at 799; Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2214.
224. See supra notes 201–202 and accompanying text.
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donor’s freedom of disposition, the donee’s decision to accept in this context
also imposes costs on society as a whole because the societal benefit of
honoring the donor’s intent is not realized. 225
Thus, whether the killer’s acceptance of a gift from their victim
generates negative externalities depends upon the donor’s probable intent. If
the donor did not intend their killer to take a portion of their estate, then the
killer’s acceptance of the gift produces negative externalities. Alternatively,
if the donor intended to benefit their killer despite the killer’s wrongdoing,
the killer’s acceptance of the gift does not produce negative externalities.
Nevertheless, the application of the traditional slayer rule does not depend
upon the donor’s intent; it simply applies to all situations in which the donee
intentionally kills the donor, regardless of what the circumstances suggest
about the donor’s intent to benefit their killer. 226 Indeed, in the vast majority
of states, the slayer rule is absolute, barring the donee from taking even if the
donor expressly provides in their will that the donee should take in the event
that the donee kills them. 227
Proponents of the mandatory nature of the slayer rule might argue that
the vast majority of donors do not want their killers to benefit from their
estates, and therefore a broad prohibition of killers taking from their victims
is justified. The suggestion that the slayer rule reflects majoritarian
preferences is likely correct, 228 but the suggestion that it reflects a universal
preference is undoubtedly false. Although they are the exception, some
donors likely want to benefit their killers. 229 Yet, under the traditional law,
the killer is barred from accepting the gift in all situations, even those

225. See supra Section I.A.
226. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137.
227. See id.
228. See Simmons, supra note 77, at 131.
229. See Ryan Konsdorf & Scott Alden Prulhiere, Killing Your Chances of Inheriting: The
Problem with the Application of the Slayer Statute to Cases of Assisted Suicide, 39 AM. C. TR. &
EST. COUNS. L.J. 399, 413 (2013) (“One of the . . . main purposes behind the slayer statute is the
presumption that a deceased testator would most likely not wish or intend for the murderous actor
to continue to inherit, either by intestacy or by will. This is a logical presumption and one that
would seem to apply in most, if not all, cases of a murdered testator. However, this presumption
does not hold weight when the factual circumstances of a particular case shift from that of a murder
to that of assisted suicide.”); Spivack, supra note 16, at 160–62 (suggesting situations in which “it
seems less than clear that the victim’s intent would necessarily be to disinherit the killer,”
specifically those involving killings between family members). Even if proponents of a mandatory
slayer rule concede that some donors intend to benefit their killers, they might still argue that
restraint of the killer’s freedom of inheritance is warranted because the killer’s intended benefit is
accelerated. See Monopoli, supra note 141, at 275 (“Society does not want to encourage people to
kill to accelerate their inheritances.”). If the donor does not intend their killer to receive an
accelerated benefit, then a restraint of acceptance might be warranted in this context. However, if
the donor intends their killer to benefit despite the killer’s act of killing, then the donor also likely
understands that the killer’s benefit is accelerated by the act of killing, and consequently the donor
likely also intends the killer to receive the accelerated benefit.
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situations that present no negative externality concerns because the donor
intends to benefit the killer. 230
Therefore, unlike the law’s partial restraints of rejection, which are
narrowly tailored to address the problem of negative externalities, 231 the
traditional slayer rule is overly broad because it restrains the exercise of
freedom of inheritance in situations that do not raise negative externality
concerns. The overinclusiveness of this live hand restraint is socially
detrimental because it forestalls the beneficial exercise of freedom of
inheritance in situations in which the donor truly intended to benefit their
killer. Thus, although the slayer rule can be explained as preventing a
murderous donee from making decisions that generate negative externalities,
a closer analysis reveals that this rationale does not justify the rule’s universal
application and that social welfare might be maximized through reforms that
permit a killer to inherit from their victim in some situations.
IV. HARMONIZING RESTRAINTS THROUGH REFORM
This Article’s comparative analysis of the law’s restraints of acceptance
and its restraints of rejection suggests that the slayer rule should not be a
mandatory rule that prevents the slayer from taking from their victim’s estate
in all cases. Instead, it suggests that the slayer rule should be changed from
a mandatory rule to a default rule. Because most people would not want their
killers to benefit from their estates, the law should presume that slayers are
barred from inheriting from their victims. 232 However, no externalities are
generated from the slayer’s exercise of freedom of inheritance in situations
where the victim intended the slayer to exercise such freedom. 233
Consequently, the rule should not bar inheritance by the slayer when the
decedent intended the killer to inherit despite the killer’s conduct. 234
Although a social welfare analysis suggests that the slayer rule should be a
default rule, questions remain regarding how the law should identify the
donor’s intent to opt out of the rule’s application.
Professor Jeffrey Sherman has proposed one possible method for
identifying the donor’s intent that their killer should inherit. Specifically, he
argued that a killer should take from their victim’s estate when objective
evidence suggests that the donor’s death was the result of a mercy killing. 235
As Professor Sherman summarizes:
230. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137.
231. See supra Section III.A.
232. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
233. See supra Section II.B.3.
234. See supra Section III.B.
235. See Sherman, supra note 156, at 808 (“In this article, I shall argue that the slayer rule should
not be applied in cases of mercy killing or assisted suicide, even if the criminal law continues to
regard such actions as unlawful.” (footnote omitted)).
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Sometimes killing can be a kindness and death a consummation
devoutly to be wished. While the retributive purposes of the
criminal law may be well served by continuing to punish mercy
killings and assisted suicides, the dispositive purposes of the slayer
rule are not well served by applying it in those instances. An
exception to the slayer rule should [therefore] be found whenever
the slaying was an assisted suicide or was carried out to relieve the
suffering of one afflicted with a permanent and incurable illness
that would ultimately have caused his death or with a permanent
and irreversible incapacity that imposed severe physiological or
psychological pain on the victim. 236
In addition to Professor Sherman’s proposal that focuses on mercy
killings, the slayer statutes in the two states that allow the donor to opt out of
the rule provide other possible ways in which the donor’s intent can be
identified. 237 One of these allows the killer to inherit only under limited
circumstances. In particular, Louisiana’s slayer rule does not bar the killer
from taking if the killer “proves reconciliation with or forgiveness by the
decedent.” 238 This language would seem to limit a killer’s ability to inherit
from their victim to situations in which the killer mortally wounds the donor
but the donor forgives the beneficiary’s conduct prior to death. 239
Wisconsin, the other state that allows a decedent to opt out of the slayer
rule, provides two additional methods for identifying the donor’s intent. 240
First, a killer can inherit from their victim if “[t]he court finds that, under the
factual situation created by the killing, the decedent’s wishes would best be
carried out by means of another disposition of the property.” 241 Second,
Wisconsin’s slayer rule does not bar a killer from inheriting if the victim
“provide[s] in . . . [their] will, . . . that th[e] [rule] does not apply.” 242 Thus,
236. See id. at 874.
237. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
238. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 943 (2018).
239. This scenario is not impossible to imagine. See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2214 (“A mortally
wounded testator might linger for a time, and in the aftermath forgive his or her slayer . . . .”). The
Louisiana rule applies both to completed killings and attempted killings. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 941. Thus, the forgiveness exception might only apply to attempted killings. See Rhodes, supra
note 87, at 980–81 (“Reconciliation appears to be possible only with cases of attempted murder,
where the victim and heir would have the time and opportunity to reconcile after the failed
attempt.”). However, it is at least arguable that Louisiana’s forgiveness exception applies to mercy
killings or other scenarios in which the killer consents to the beneficiary’s conduct. See
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137 (suggesting that reconciliation or forgiveness
“perhaps can be shown by proof of the decedent’s consent to the slaying”); Cohen, supra note 140,
at 799 n.46 (listing Louisiana as a jurisdiction “allowing mercy killers to inherit”).
240. See WIS. STAT. § 854.14(6) (2018).
241. Id. § 854.14(6)(a).
242. Id. § 854.14(6)(b). Professor Sherman suggests a similar exception to the slayer rule. See
Sherman, supra note 156, at 866 (“Suppose a testator’s will provides: ‘I devise and bequeath my
estate to A, even if A should kill me.’ . . . [S]uch a testamentary instruction should insulate A from
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Wisconsin’s probate courts can identify the donor’s intent to benefit their
killer by either looking for an express statement in the donor’s will or by
considering any extrinsic evidence of the donor’s intent.
As Professor Sherman’s proposal and the Louisiana and Wisconsin
statutes illustrate, a donor’s ability to opt out of the slayer rule is broadened
or narrowed depending on the type of evidence that a probate court can
consider. The narrowest default slayer rule would allow the donor to opt out
only by an express provision in their will. 243 Under this approach, the probate
court could not look beyond the four corners of the donor’s will to identify
any intent that the donor’s killer should inherit. The broadest default slayer
rule would not prescribe how the donor can communicate their intent but
would instead allow the probate court to consider any evidence of the donor’s
intent to opt out of the rule’s application.244
Between these two extremes lie methods of identifying the donor’s
intent to opt out of the slayer rule that require the court to consider specific
extrinsic evidence. Louisiana’s slayer rule is one example of this middle
ground approach in that the killer cannot establish the victim’s intent by any
and all evidence; instead, the killer must present evidence that specifically
establishes forgiveness by or reconciliation with the decedent.245 Likewise,
under Sherman’s mercy killing exception, the killer inherits only if the
donor’s intent is established through circumstantial evidence regarding the
manner of the donor’s death. 246 Under both of these approaches, only
extrinsic evidence of a specific type can establish the donor’s intent to opt
out of the slayer rule’s operation.
Recognizing that probate courts can consider various types of evidence
of the donor’s intent leads to the question of which method will maximize
social welfare. Two variables should be considered when deciding which
method of identifying the donor’s intent should be used in the context of the
slayer rule: (1) accuracy and (2) efficiency. First, because the law of
succession’s primary goal is to carry out the donor’s intended estate plan, the
law should strive to make accurate determinations of that intent. 247 A
mandatory slayer rule is undoubtedly deficient in this regard because the
donor cannot opt out of its application. 248 In every case that a donor prefers

the operation of the slayer rule. The rule is founded on our concern for the testator’s intent.”
(footnote omitted)).
243. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 854.14(6)(b).
244. See, e.g., id. § 854.14(6)(a).
245. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 943 (2018). The comment to this article, however, makes
clear that “[t]he measure of sufficient conduct to conclude that reconciliation has occurred or that
forgiveness has occurred has been intentionally left to the courts.” Id. art. 943 cmt.
246. See Sherman, supra note 156, at 874.
247. See supra note 150.
248. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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to benefit their killer, the traditional slayer rule reaches the incorrect
outcome. 249
Second, the law should strive to make efficient determinations of the
donor’s intent to opt out of the slayer rule. 250 The probate system’s task of
carrying out the donor’s intended estate plan can generate decision costs
because when questions arise regarding the donor’s intent, they must be
litigated. Consequently, the court and interested parties must expend time,
money, and effort producing and considering evidence in order to answer
these questions. 251 Social welfare is maximized by a default slayer rule only
if the benefits of increased accuracy regarding the donor’s intent outweigh
the decision costs of making more accurate determinations of intent. 252 If the
costs of determining the donor’s intent to opt out of the slayer rule outweigh
the benefit of increased accuracy, then a default rule will not maximize social
welfare.
Although the traditional slayer rule does not always result in accurate
determinations of the donor’s intent, 253 it does minimize the decision costs
associated with such determinations. Because the traditional slayer rule is
mandatory, the parties need not produce and the probate court will never
consider evidence that might suggest the donor intended to opt out of the

249. See supra notes 228–230 and accompanying text.
250. See Peter T. Wendel, Wills Act Compliance and the Harmless Error Approach: Flawed
Narrative Equals Flawed Analysis?, 95 OR. L. REV. 337, 382 (2017) (explaining “that one of the
important public policy considerations . . . is . . . the costs of administration associated with
ascertaining and giving effect to testator’s intent”); see also Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 367 (2017) (“Like other landscapes, the legal landscape is an
environment of scarce resources. The success and even wisdom of a rule depends in no small
measure on its frugality.”).
251. See Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 616 (2006) (“‘Decision
costs’ . . . means any burden, such as a resource expenditure or opportunity cost, associated with
reaching decision. This covers time, money, and emotional distress from uncertainty, conflict,
worry, and the like. And it reaches everyone who bears these costs, whether public or private
actors.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretative Choice, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 111 (2000) (“‘Decision costs’ is a broad rubric that might encompass direct
(out-of-pocket) costs of litigation to litigants and the judicial bureaucracy, including the costs of
supplying judges with information needed to decide the case at hand and formulate doctrines to
govern future cases; the opportunity costs of litigation to litigants and judges (that is, the time spent
on a case that could be spent on other cases); and the costs to lower courts of implementing and
applying doctrines developed at higher levels.”). The emotional cost of probate litigation may be
particularly high because the process occurs “during a time when [the parties] are still grieving the
loss of a loved one.” Mark Glover, The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U.
KAN. L. REV. 139, 146 (2012).
252. The same type of analysis has been suggested in the context of will-authentication. See
James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1033 (1992) (“[W]e should ask . . .
whether [a method of will-authentication] promotes the intent of the testator at an acceptable
administrative cost.”); Wendel, supra note 250, at 390 (“The challenge in creating and applying a
Wills Act is how to balance the competing public policy considerations of testator’s intent, costs of
administration, and potential for misconduct.”).
253. See supra notes 248–249 and accompanying text.
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rule. 254 Thus, a mandatory slayer rule is relatively easy for probate courts to
apply. But again, this does not mean that such a rule maximizes social
welfare. As previously explained, a default slayer rule will maximize social
welfare if more accurate outcomes regarding the donor’s intent to benefit
their killer can be reached without generating offsetting decision costs.
Professor Sherman did not expressly frame his analysis of the slayer rule
in this way, but he intuitively understood that the different methods by which
probate courts can identify the donor’s intent might affect social welfare to
varying degrees. In particular, when advocating for his proposed mercy
killing exception, Professor Sherman rejected Louisiana’s approach to the
slayer rule because of the difficulties of assessing evidence of forgiveness or
reconciliation. 255 He explained, “[T]he slayer rule should [not] be
disregarded whenever the victim has ‘forgiven’ the slayer. Evidence of the
victim’s forgiveness may be too easily manufactured or the forgiveness itself
coerced.” 256 These problems that Professor Sherman identified with an
approach to opting out of the slayer rule that focuses on the donor’s
forgiveness fit squarely within this Article’s social welfare framework.
With respect to accuracy, Professor Sherman seems to have recognized
that determining the donor’s subjective intent is a difficult task. For instance,
he suggests that probate courts should not be concerned with the issue of the
donor’s forgiveness because evidence of this subjective issue has an
increased risk of being “manufactured.” 257 Although Professor Sherman
does not fully explain his concerns, the problem could be that any suggestion
that the donor spoke forgivingly of their slayer or made any type of
sympathetic gesture toward them could be used to establish the donor’s
forgiveness. As Professor Sherman suggests, this type of evidence could be
fabricated with the intent to mislead the probate court, or it could also be
innocently introduced but equivocal in nature. 258 If probate courts rely on
spurious or ambiguous claims of reconciliation, then they will make incorrect
determinations of the donor’s intent, and social welfare will be decreased
because the accuracy of the probate process is diminished.
The difficulty in determining subjective issues of intent, such as whether
the donor forgave their killer, is exacerbated by the reality that probate courts
are charged with determining the intent of someone who is inevitably dead.
Because probate occurs after the donor’s death,259 the best evidence of the
donor’s intent is unavailable, as the donor cannot simply appear in court and

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
See Sherman, supra note 156, at 865–66.
Id. at 865 (footnote omitted).
Id.
See id.
In a few states, probate may occur prior to the testator’s death. See DUKEMINIER &
SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 312.
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testify regarding what they intended. 260 Because the donor is dead, they
cannot provide context to the statements or actions that are introduced as
evidence of their intent, and as such, there is no assurance that probate courts
can accurately make determinations of the donor’s subjective intent.261
The same criticism that Professor Sherman levied against Louisiana’s
approach to the slayer rule can be directed toward one of Wisconsin’s
approaches. Whereas Louisiana directs probate courts to focus solely upon
evidence of forgiveness, 262 Wisconsin allows courts to consider any and all
evidence of the donor’s intent to opt out the slayer rule. 263 By expanding the
scope of evidence that courts can consider, the Wisconsin approach presents
an even greater possibility for ambiguous or manufactured evidence of the
donor’s subjective intent. With this authority to assess a potentially broad
and contradictory collection of evidence, Wisconsin’s probate courts might
exercise their discretion incorrectly and determine that slayers should inherit
when in reality their victims intended them to be barred from taking.
In addition to accuracy, efficiency is the second consideration that
should inform how the law identifies the donor’s intent to opt out of the slayer
rule. As explained above, the task of making accurate determinations of the
donor’s intent can be costly, as the parties and the court must produce and
assess relevant evidence. 264 A default slayer rule will maximize social
welfare only if the benefits of making accurate determinations of the donor’s
intent outweigh the costs of making those determinations. While Professor
Sherman’s critique of Louisiana’s forgiveness exception to the slayer rule
raises concerns regarding accuracy, 265 it also raises efficiency concerns.
In particular, the risk that evidence of forgiveness can be readily
manufactured may lead to higher rates of litigation regarding the donor’s
intent. With the opportunity to present any evidence of the donor’s
forgiveness, killers might fabricate such evidence, thereby inflating the
number of disputes that probate courts must resolve. Similar concerns
regarding increased litigation rates arise when one considers Wisconsin’s
approach that allows probate courts to consider, not just evidence of
forgiveness, but any extrinsic evidence of the donor’s intent. 266 Under this

260. See Sitkoff, supra note 4, at 646–47 (“A will is a peculiar legal instrument . . . in that it
does not take effect until after the testator dies. As a consequence, probate courts follow what has
been called a ‘worst evidence’ rule of procedure. The witness who is best able to [provide evidence
of intent] is dead by the time the court considers such issues.” (footnote omitted)).
261. See Hirsch, supra note 250, at 287 (“The mind of a testator teems with data, but data that
is difficult to access, and assess, without risk of inaccuracy or misrepresentation. Death compounds
those risks.”).
262. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 943 (2018).
263. See WIS. STAT. § 854.14(6)(a) (2018).
264. See supra notes 250–252 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 257–261 and accompanying text.
266. See WIS. STAT. § 854.14(6)(a).

2020]

RESTRAINING LIVE HAND CONTROL OF INHERITANCE

369

approach, the possibility of increased litigation rates stems not only from the
opportunity for manufactured evidence but also from the reality that some
legitimate evidence might exist in many cases. Killers would likely present
evidence of any stray comment or act by their victim that could conceivably
suggest the slayer rule should not apply. By opening the door for courts to
consider the donor’s subjective intent in these ways, Louisiana’s and
Wisconsin’s approach to the slayer rule run the risk of increasing litigation
rates, which in turn raises concerns that a default slayer rule does not
maximize social welfare. 267
Because of the difficulties of accurately and efficiently deciding issues
regarding the donor’s subjective intent, the law sometimes directs probate
courts to decide objective issues that serve as proxies for the donor’s intent. 268
For example, the law of most states does not task probate courts with
determining whether a donor subjectively intended a particular document to
constitute a legally effective will; instead, the conventional law directs courts
to consider the objective issue of whether the donor complied with prescribed
will-execution formalities. 269
Although the particularities of these
formalities vary from state to state, they generally require that a will be
written, signed by the donor, and attested by two witnesses. 270 If the probate
court determines that a will complies with these formalities, the law presumes
that the donor intended the will to be legally effective, 271 and if the court
decides that the will does not comply, the law presumes that the donor did
not intend the will to be legally effective. 272 In short, the law substitutes the
objective issue of formal compliance for the subjective issue of the donor’s
intent. 273

267. See Hirsch, supra note 250, at 296 (“By calling on courts to judge a testator’s volitional
state of mind, we would impose on courts an evidentiary burden that raises their decision costs. By
barring such evidence, we would lessen those costs.”).
268. See generally Hirsch, supra note 250; see also infra note 276.
269. See Mark Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 337
(2016) (“The classification of a will as authentic or inauthentic is . . . made using indirect evidence
of the decedent’s intent. Specifically, the law relies upon the decedent’s compliance with the
formalities of will-execution to serve as an easily recognizable proxy for the intent that a will be
legally effective.”); Hirsch, supra note 250, at 290 (“The essence of a will is testamentary intent.
This volitional attribute defines the category, distinguishing wills from other transfers of property.
Lawmakers need not, however, rely on a state-of-mind rule to discover intent. The protocols
accompanying a transfer could serve as an external standard to determine its character.” (footnote
omitted)).
270. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 148–50.
271. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489,
500 (1975) (explaining that the “fundamental requisite[]” of “testamentary intent [is] presumed from
due execution”).
272. See id. at 489 (“[O]nce a formal defect is found, Anglo-American courts . . . conclud[e]
that the attempted will fails.”).
273. See Kevin Bennardo & Mark Glover, The Location of Holographic Wills, 97 N.C. L. REV.
1625, 1649–50 (2019).
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This type of substitution, one that replaces a subjective issue of intent
with an objective factual issue, simplifies the probate court’s task. Whereas
deciding issues of testamentary intent are relatively difficult because direct
observation of one’s subjective intent is impossible, 274 and because the
testator is unavailable to testify regarding their intent, 275 factual
determinations are typically easier for probate courts to decide. 276 For
instance, when a probate court focuses on the testator’s compliance with willexecution formalities, they need not consider any and all evidence that might
be relevant to the testator’s intent that a will be legally effective, but instead
the court must simply look to the face of the will and determine the factual
issue of whether the will satisfies the formal requirements. This focus, not
on subjective intent, but on objective fact, makes the court’s task easier, 277
and it minimizes the expense of making accurate decisions regarding
testamentary intent. 278
Again, although Professor Sherman did not expressly frame his mercy
killing exception within this Article’s framework, he understood the potential
benefit of directing courts to consider an objective proxy of the donor’s
intent, rather than directing the probate court to directly decide the subjective
issue of intent. He explains, “The proposed [mercy killing] exception is . . .
274. See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 656 (1988)
(referencing “the impossible search for subjective intent”); Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s
Object and Purpose Pending Entry Into Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 283, 303 (2001) (“[A]s a philosophical truism, it may be well-nigh impossible to identify
someone else’s subjective intent; to paraphrase an ancient maxim, not even the devil knows what is
inside a man’s head.”).
275. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
276. See Hirsch, supra note 250, at 363–64 (“Thoughts cost more than a proverbial penny, but
so too do other items of evidence. Lawmakers can compare recourse to an external standard with a
related state-of-mind rule and decide which provides greater value (i.e., accuracy) for money. . . .
When might we expect a state-of-mind rule to prove comparatively efficient? The question could
hinge on the scope of the factual inquiry required to carry out objective policy. Where that inquiry
is narrow, an external standard becomes more reliable and cheaper to apply.”).
277. See Langbein, supra note 271, at 494 (“Compliance with the Wills Act formalities for
executing witnessed wills results in considerable uniformity in the organization, language, and
content of most wills. Courts are seldom left to puzzle whether the document was meant to be a
will.” (footnote omitted)); James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68
N.C. L. REV. 541, 544 (1990) (“[F]ormalities channel almost all wills into the same patterns, letting
well-counseled testators know what they must do to execute a valid will, reducing the administrative
costs of determining which documents are wills, and thus increasing the reliability of our system of
testation.”); see also Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
597, 630 (2014) (“This standardization is a product of the strict compliance requirement, which
requires the court to indiscriminately invalidate all formally deficient documents.”).
278. See Hirsch, supra note 129, at 804 (“In economic terms, . . . we can justify the imposition
of expensive formalities on parties as functioning to avoid spillover costs—internalizing the
negative externality created by state-supported construction proceedings for transfers formulated in
ambiguous ways.”); David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning
Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 577 (2017) (“[T]he need to prevent spillover costs—not the desire
to carry out the decedent’s intent—furnishes the most forceful reasons to take the Wills Act at its
letter.”).
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confined to cases where the inference of the victim’s consent may to some
extent be objectively substantiated, either by the victim’s physical condition
prior to the homicide or by the fact that the victim was the agent of her own
destruction.” 279 By turning the court’s focus to the objective fact of the
donor’s physical condition prior to death, Professor Sherman’s mercy killing
exception removes from the court’s purview the potentially broad and
contradictory set of evidence that could bear on the issue of the donor’s
subjective intent. 280 In doing so, Professor Sherman steers probate courts to
questions that they can more easily and more accurately answer.
Although the objective nature of Professor Sherman’s mercy killing
exception should provide policymakers some assurance that such a default
slayer rule would increase social welfare, his proposal does raise one concern
that Louisiana’s default slayer rule does not. In particular, there might be
questions regarding the link between the objective issue of the donor’s
condition prior to the killing and the subjective issue of the donor’s intent to
benefit their killer. Whereas there is a clear connection between a donor’s
forgiveness of their killer and their intent that their killer inherit, it is not as
clear that a donor who is suffering from an incurable terminal illness or is
permanently incapacitated would want their killer to inherit. It is reasonable
to assume that some, if not most, donors in these situations would want their
killers to inherit but not necessarily all. Professor Sherman’s mercy killing
exception, therefore, might result in a probate court correctly determining
that the donor’s death was the result of a mercy killing, while at the same
time incorrectly determining that the donor intended their killer to inherit.
This possibility for incorrect determinations of the donor’s intent to opt out
of the slayer rule raises concerns that a mercy killing exception might not
increase social welfare.
While Professor Sherman’s mercy killing exception raises some
uncertainty regarding whether it will increase social welfare, Wisconsin’s
second approach to the slayer rule almost certainly results in a net societal
benefit. As described above, Wisconsin allows a donor to opt out of the
slayer rule by expressly stating their intent to do so in their will. 281 If the
court identifies an explicit statement in the donor’s will that the slayer rule
should not apply, then there is little uncertainty regarding the donor’s intent,
and as such, policymakers should have confidence that such a default slayer

279. Sherman, supra note 156, at 865–66 (emphasis added).
280. While Sherman’s proposal does not focus on the subjective intent of the donor to benefit
their killer, it does turn the court’s attention to the subjective intent of the killer. Specifically, the
mercy killing exception would allow a killer to inherit only “if the killer proves . . . that he killed
the decedent with the intention of relieving the decedent’s suffering.” Id. at 875 (emphasis added).
This aspect of the mercy killing exception could raise concerns regarding the court’s ability to
accurately and efficiently determine the killer’s motive.
281. See WIS. STAT. § 854.14(6)(b) (2018).
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rule will produce accurate outcomes. 282 Moreover, from an efficiency
standpoint, there is little concern that an express statement exception to the
slayer rule will generate significant decision costs because the court is not
authorized to consider extrinsic evidence of the donor’s intent. Either the
will contains a provision that expressly opts out of the slayer rule, or it does
not. 283 Litigation rates regarding the donor’s intent would therefore likely
not increase under this type of default slayer rule.284
Because an express statement exception to the slayer rule would result
in more accurate determinations of the donor’s intent while not significantly
increasing the costs of identifying that intent, policymakers around the
country should follow the lead of their Wisconsin counterparts and transform
the traditional mandatory slayer rule into a default rule from which the donor
can expressly opt out. Allowing a donor to expressly opt out of the slayer
rule’s application through a testamentary provision would facilitate the
exercise of freedom of disposition and increase social welfare. However,
whether policymakers should adopt Professor Sherman’s mercy killing
exception or Wisconsin’s alternative approach that allows the court to
consider extrinsic evidence of the donor’s intent is unclear because difficult
theoretical and empirical questions remain regarding the accuracy and
efficiency of such approaches.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the law grants donees broad freedom to accept or reject
inheritances, 285 it restricts this freedom in various ways. Indeed, the law
restrains the donee’s ability to reject a gift under some scenarios, 286 and it
restrains their ability to accept a gift under others. 287 A social welfare
analysis suggests that these restraints, whether of rejection or acceptance, are
282. This is the rationale for the law’s general directive that courts should identify the testator’s
intent by attributing the plain meaning to a will’s words. See Tinnin v. First United Bank of Miss.,
502 So. 2d 659, 663 (Miss. 1987) (“The surest guide to testamentary intent is the wording employed
by the maker of the will.”); Champine, supra note 25, at 401 (explaining that the plain meaning rule
“offers predictability to all testators, assuring them that their wishes, if expressed unambiguously,
will be respected”).
283. In some situations, a provision in a will might be ambiguous regarding whether the testator
intended to opt out of the slayer rule. If policymakers consider this to be a legitimate concern, the
law could require the testator to expressly reference the statutory provision authorizing them to opt
out of the slayer rule’s application. Indeed, this is the approach authorized in Wisconsin. See WIS.
STAT. § 854.14(6)(b).
284. While there might not be significant increases in litigation rates regarding the meaning of
the testator’s expressed intent, there might be concern that a default slayer rule would increase
claims of fraud, duress, and undue influence. This concern might be particularly acute if the testator
executes their will very close to death. See Mark Glover, The Timing of Testation, 107 KY. L.J.
221, 244–48 (2019); Hirsch, supra note 129, at 845.
285. See supra Section I.B.
286. See supra Section II.A.2.
287. See supra Section II.A.1.
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primarily founded upon the concern that the donee’s exercise of freedom of
inheritance will impose costs on others that the donee likely does not take
into account when making their decision to accept or reject a gift. 288 In these
situations, the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance might not be
socially beneficial, and, consequently, the law restricts the donee’s decisionmaking capacity.
Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the law’s two types of live hand
restraints reveals that the law’s restraints of rejection are narrowly tailored to
minimize negative externalities, while keeping the donee’s freedom of
inheritance largely intact. 289 By contrast, the law’s primary restraint of
acceptance, namely the slayer rule, is overly broad and restricts the donee’s
freedom of inheritance even in situations that do not raise externality
concerns. 290 Based on this analysis, reform of the slayer rule is needed in
order to harmonize the law’s restraints of live hand control and to ensure that
social welfare is maximized through the disposition of property upon
death. 291
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289.
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See supra Section II.B.
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